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Drafi Recommendation
on a European defence policy
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the Council's initiative in starting to formulate a common European defence policy as
announced in the declaration on Western European Union affached to the Maastricht Treaty;
(ii) Having taken note of both the Noordwijk declaration and the preliminary conclusions on the
formulation of a common European defence policy of 14th November 1994;
(iii) Noting that WEU's inability to react quickly to crisis situations as in Bosnia or Rwanda is due not
only to a lack of political will, but also to the fact that joint European interests have not yet been identified
clearly enough and that mechanisms for making and implementing decisions rapidly have not yet been
developed;
(iv) Stressing that the operational r6le of WEU urgently needs to be strengthened in order to match the
ambitions set out in the Maasricht Treaty and repeatedly expressed by the Council, while recognising that
the lack of progress in developing WEU's operational r6le is due partly to the lack of political guidance
from a corlmon European defence policy on which it should be based;
(v) Stressing that the transformation of NAIO, and especially the implementation of decisions taken at
NATO's 1994 Brussels summit meeting, is of vital importance for the reinforcement of WEU;
(vi) Recognising that WEU's reinforcement must be founded partly in NAIO and not replace a failing
NATO;
(vii) Surprised that the reinforcement of the European pillar of NAIO is accompanied by a reduction in
WEU member states' share of defence expenditures in the Atlantic Alliance;
(viii) Recalling that the possibiliry of making NATO's collective assets available to WEU cannot relieve
European states of their obligation to make a specific effort in those key defence areas where the alliance
has no collective assets while being dependent on the national assets of the United States, specifically in
the area of satellite intelligence and logistic capacity;
(ix) Recalling that the massive airlift capacity now available in the United States armed forces inventory
may considerably diminish in size by the turn of this century, making it necessary for European armed
forces to assume their own responsibility in this field;
(x) Recognising that European armed forces are increasingly called upon to perform humanitarian and
peace-keeping tasks while at the same time defence budgets are being reduced in most European states,
perhaps even in some cases below a level compafible with the maintenance of credible armed forces;
(xi) Insisting that co-operation between European national armed forces must be intensified, also
through the formation of multinational forces, in order to make the most effective use of diminishing
defence budgets and smaller armed forces;
(xii) Noting that the status of associate partner has provided significant opportunities for the countries
concerned to help shape a future European defence policy and to co-operate closely with WEU in possible
future WEU operations of all kinds;
(xiii) Welcoming the first meetings of WEU's Mediterranean Group with government experts from
Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, but at the same time sffessing that WEU should pay
closer attention to the situation in the southern Mediterranean extending beyond the present diplomatic
dialogue;
(xiv) Recognising that the situation in the former republics of the Soviet Union, in particular Russia,
should be continuously followed by WEU, inter alia through regular contacts at both political and
military level with the objective of fostering mutual confidence and understanding;
(xv) Considering that lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia would be an incentive for the parties
concerned to escalate the conflict, further endanger the civilian population and cause unacceptable risks
for the United Nations forces on the ground;
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(ni) Regrening the decision of the United States Government, taken unilaterally and without appropriate
prior consultation with the other states participating in the combined WEUATATO operation Sharp Guard
in the Adriatic, to stop policing the United Nations arms embargo against Bosnia;
(ruri) Stressing that the October 1994 crisis in haq and the decision of the United States to stop policing
the arms embargo against Bosnia in the framework of operation Sharp Guard have provided compelling
evidence that Europe needs to have its own independent intelligence policy, including a fully-fledged
satellite system,
Rrcorvrvmxos rHAr rrm CouNcn
1. Strengthen the r6le of the Secretary-General, while at the same time defining clearly WEU's
responsibilities compared with those of the European Union and NATO;
2. Reinforce the dperational r6le of the Planning Cell, duly enlarging its staff and providing it with the
appropriate equipment and technical resources for data processing and communications;
3. Give liaison officers from associate partners a more active r6le in the Planning Cell, in particular by
drafting a list of forces of associate partners available to WEU and by including units from these countries
in force packages for contingency plans;
4. Actively support the creation of a multinational African peace-keeping force which should be able
to act rapidly under a United Nations mandate, by encouraging WEU member states to preposition equip-
ment on the African continent and to take responsibility to frain African units for such tasks;
5. Help in creating a readily available multinational European humanitarian intervention force to be
included among the forces answerable to WEU;
6. Give further thought to a cornmon security and defence policy, leading subsequently to the drafting
of a white paper on European security as proposed by the French Prime Minister specifying the r6le, tasks,joint command structures and politicaUmilitary interface procedures of WEU for approval at a summit
meetingof headsof stateandof govemmentof WEUmemberstatesin 1996atthelatest;
7. Accelerate the creation of a European armaments agency to manage multinational co-operative
programmes, drawing on experience gained from the Franco-German armaments agency now being
established;
8. Continue to pursue actively the establishment of a European satellite system which will be a vital
part of Europe's defence identity;
9. Notwithstanding the United States unilateral decision to end enforcement of the United Nations
arms embargo against Bosnia, maintain its determination to continue to implement fully the enforcement
of all existing embargoes against the different parts of former Yugoslavia, including the arrns embargo
against Bosnia.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submilted by Mr. Baumel Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
1. ln the Kirchberg declaration of 24thMay
t994, the WEU Council tasked the Permanent
Council " to begin work on the formulation of a
common European defence policy with a view to
presenting preliminary conclusions at their next
ministerial meeting in the Netherlands ".
2. The Assembly greatly welcomed this ini-
tiative and expressed its wish to play an active
r6le in the formation of this common European
defence policy. It is recalled here that in Article J4
of the Treaty on European Union the Union
requested WEU, as an integral part of the deve-
lopment of the Union, " to elaborate and imple-
ment decisions and actions of the Union which
have defence implications ".
3. In the declaration on Western European
Union which is attached to the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union, the WEU member states agreed " to
strengthen the r6le of WEU in the longer term
perspective of a common defence policy within
the European Union which might in time lead to a
common defence, compatible with that of the
Atlantic Alliance'0. They also stated that WEU
would " formulate a cofirmon European defence
policy and carry forward its concrete implementa-
tion through the further development of its own
operational r6le ".
4. According to the last paragraph of the above-
mentioned Article J4, the provisions of this article
oo 
may be revised (...) on the basis of a report to be
presented in 1996 by the Council to the European
Council, which shall include an evaluation of the
progress made and the experience gained until
then ".
5. After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty
in February |992,WEU started to implement the
abovementioned declaration on WEU and an
important frst step was made with the Petersberg
declaration of 19th lullre 1992, which in particular
laid the foundations for the strengthening of
WEU's operational r6le. It appears, however, that
the member states were far more reluctant to for-
mulate a cornmon European defence policy which
logically should have preceded the future deve-
lopment of WEU's operational r6le. The timely
initiative of the Council to start work on this issue
is therefore fully endorsed by the Assembly and in
the present report an effort is made to discuss a
number of issues which are bound to play a rdle in
Europe's corlmon defence policy.
6. The transformation of NATO, set in motion
after the fall of the Berlin wall, is considered to be
of vital importance. In addition to providing more
flexible forces formany new and different tasks, it
also envisages including the states of Cenftal and
Eastern Europe in a process of building security in
an area which extends far beyond that covered by
the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. Moreover,
it is emphasised that, without the transformation
of NAIO, WEU will not be able to play a signifi-
cant operational r6le. Prospects for the CSCE as
an all-encompassing European security forum are
reviewed. For a discussion of the issues related to
the enlargement of NAIO and WEU, reference is
made to a parallel report of the Assembly's Politi-
cal Committee'.
7. The present state of affairs in Russia, in
particular as related to defence issues and the spe-
cific position of the Baltic states, is discussed suc-
cinctly. Then follows the inevitable inventory of
major risks and threats to European security.
8. Finally, an account is given of develop-
ments in WEU and its member states.
II. The transformatian of NATO
(a) The early phase
9. After the collapse of the Berlin wall, the
Atlantic Alliance understood that it had to trans-
form itself from a purely defensive organisation,
created to protect its members against a massive
attack from the East, into something quite ffierent.
10. The foundations for this transformation
were formulated in the London declaration of 5th
and 6th July 1990. While maintaining the original
objective of providing common defence, it was
thought that the alliance should also help build
structures of a more united European continent,
" supporting security and stability with the
strength of our shared faith in democracy, the
right of the individual, and the peaceful resolution
of disputes " 2.
1,1. Reaffirming that security and stability do
not lie solely in the military dimension, it sought
1. A European security policy 
- 
report submitted by Mr.
Soell, Rapporteur, Document 1439.
2. NATO's London declaration, 5th and 6th July 1990,
paragraph2.
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to enhance the political component of the alliance
as provided for by Article 2 of the North Atlantic
Treaty. It recognised that: o'The move within the
European Community towards political union,
including the development of a European identity
in the domain of security, will also contribute to
Atlantic solidarity and to the establishment of ajust and lasting order of peace throughout the
whole of Europe3 ".
12. [t was decided that NAIO should build new
partnerships with all the nations of Europe and
extend the hand of friendship to the countries of
the East which were its adversaries.
13. Arms control agreements were considered
essential and, with their implementation, the
alliance's integrated force structure and its strate-
gy would change fundamentally to include the
following elements:a
- 
" NATO will field smaller and restructu-
red active forces. These forces will be
highly mobile and versatile so that allied
leaders will have maximum flexibility in
deciding how to respond to a crisis. It
will rely increasingly on multinational
corps made up of national units.
- 
NATO will scale back the readiness of its
active units, reducing training require-
ments and the number of exercises.
- 
NATO will rely more heavily on the
ability to build up large forces if and
when they might be needed. "
14. Important decisions were also taken to
reduce the alliance's reliance on nuclear wea-
ponso.
15. Finall5 it was stated that the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)
should become more prominent in Europe. A
number of recommendations regarding the r6le
and institutionalisation of the CSCE were made,
which were formalised at the CSCE summit mee-
ting in Paris, in November 1990.
16. A new allied military strategy would be
prepared 'o moving away from forward defence,
where appropriate, towards a reduced forward
presence and modifying flexible response to
reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons "6.
3. NATO's London declaration, 5th and 6th July 1990,
paragraph 3.
4. NATO's London declaration, 5th and 6th July 1990,
paragraph 14.
5. This subject has been dealt with in a recent Assembly
report: The r6le and future of nuclear weapons, Rapporteur
Mr. De Decker, Document 1420.
6. NATO's London declaration, 5th and 6th July 1990,
paragraph 20.
Copenhagen meeting, June 1991
17. One year later, the North Atlantic Council
met in Copenhagen on 6th and 7th June 1991
providing an opportunity for a frst evaluation of a
changed security environment in Europe.
Although the general feeling could still be called
optimistic, it was clear that the first lines of divi-
sion in the " Europe whole and free " of the Lon-
don declaration became visible. Certain Central
European states were seeking to establish a close
relationship with, if not membership of, NATO.
These states were still feeling uncomfortable with
the Soviet Union at their eastern frontiers and
were trying to obtain formal security guarantees
from the alliance. For a number of reasons, the
alliance was reluctant to provide NATO member-
ship or security guarantees and in Copenhagen it
could only state that oo our own security is insepa-
rably linked to that of all other states in Europe. "
18. It further stated that: " The consolidation
and preservation throughout the continent of
democratic societies and their freedom from any
form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of
direct and material concern to uso as they are to all
other CSCE states under the commitments of the
Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. "
19. Common security, it said, could best be
safeguarded through " the further development of
a network of interlocking institutions and rela-
tionships, constituting a comprehensive architec-
ture in which the alliance, the process of European
integration and the CSCE are key elements. "
20. Furthermore, it stated that it did not " wish
to isolate any counfiry, nor to see a new division of
the continent. Our objective is to help create a
Europe whole and free "'.
21. The alliance strongly emphasised the cen-
tral r6le of the CSCE " in expanding the network
of co-operative relationships across Europe ". In
particular, it would try " to reinforce the CSCE's
potential for conflict-prevention, crisis-manage-
ment and the peaceful settlement of disputes by
appropriate means'0.
22. Further steps were also taken to develop a
security partnership with the Soviet Union and the
other Central and Eastern European states.
23. As regards the emerging common European
foreign and security policy and defence r6le, the
final communiqu6 of the North Atlantic Council in
Copenhagen stated that the alliance would " deve-
lop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary
transparency and complementarity between the
European security and defence identity as it
emerges in the Tkelve and WEU, and the alliance.
There will be a need, in particular, to establish
7. Statement issued by the North Atlantic Council on 6th and
7th June 1991, paragraph 3.
6
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appropriate links and consultation procedures
between them in order to ensure that the allies that
are not currently participating in the development
of a European identity in foreign and security poli-
cy and defence should be adequately involved in
decisions that may affect their security "8.
24. In fact, this paragraph reflects the clear
determination of the Bush administration to main-
tain its influence on new developments in the
establishment of a European defence identity.
Rome declaration, November 1991
25. In the Rome declaration, issued by the
heads of state and of government on 7th and 8th
November 1991, the concept of a framework of
interlocking institutions tying together the coun-
tries of Europe and North America in order to pre-
vent instability and divisions was confirmed.
A new sfiategic concept was published along the
lines set out in the London declaration and it was
stated that the alliance's security was " based on
three mutually reinforcing elements: dialogue,
co-operation, and the maintenance of a collective
defence capability "e.
26. The declaration stated that " the develop-
ment of a European security identity and defence
r6le, reflected in the further sffengthening of the
European pillar within the alliance, will reinforce
the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic
Alliance "'0.
27. The enhancement of the r6le and responsi-
bilities of the European members was called " an
important basis for the transformation of the
alliance ". On the other hand, it was stated that the
alliance was " the essential forum for consultation
among its members ".
28. Further, it was stated that the alliance's new
strategic concept " should facilitate the necessary
complementarity between the alliance and the
emerging defence component of the European
integration process " ".
29. As a next step in the alliance's relations
with the Soviet Union and the other countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, the alliance announ-
ced the establishment of a more institutional rela-
tionship of consultation and co-operation on poli-
tical and security issues in the framework of a
North Atlantic Co-operation Council.
8. Final communiqud of the North Atlantic Council,6th and
7th June 1991, paragraph 3.
9. Rome declaration, 7th and 8th November 1991, para-
graph4.
10. Rome declaration, 7th and 8th November 1991, para-
graph 6.
11. Rome declaration, 7th and 8th November 1991, para-
graphT.
30. Finally, the alliance was said to remain
deeply committed to strengthening the CSCE pro-
cess " which has a vital r6le to play in promoting
stability and democracy in Europe "12. It made
many suggestions to enhance the CSCE's r6le.
(b) NATO's cooperatinn programmes: NACC, PFP
and the issue of enlargement
31. Implementing NATO's November l99l
summit meeting in Rome, the North Atlantic
Co-operation Council (NACC) was created in
December 1991 assembling the NATO member
states, the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe and the now independent republics of the
former Soviet Union. NACC, with its annual
work plans, provides the allies with an excellent
oppornrnity to give support for reforms through
practical assistance in a broad range of activities
while building confidence through increased
contacts. The annual work plans include consulta-
tions on security-related matters and extensive
military contacts.
32. Very soon, however, experience showed
that these activities had given rise to a dynamic
process which obliged NAIO to move faster than
initially thought. There was also a need for more
flexibility in the co-operation process which
would enable prograrnmes to be set up that were
adapted to the individual needs and wishes of the
different participants without giving up NACC's
general co-operation programme.
33. The Brussels summit meeting of January
L994 therefore created the partnership for peace
(PFP) with significantly different scope and inten-
sity, while remaining within the overall frame-
work of NACC.
34. According to its framework document, the
objectives of the PFP are:
(i) to facilitate transparency in national
defence planning and budgeting pro-
CESSES;
(ii) to ensure democratic confol of defence
forces;
(iii) to maintain the capability and readi-
ness to contribute, subject to constitu-
tional considerations, to operations
under the authority of the United
Nations and/or the responsibility of
the CSCE;
(iv) to develop co-operative military rela-
tions with NAIO, for the purpose ofjoint planning, training, and exercises'3
12. Rome declaration, 7th and 8th November 1991, paru-
graph 13.
13. The first exercices of this kind have meanwhile been
held in Poland and the Netherlands.
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in order to strengthen their ability to
undertake missions in the fields of
peace-keeping, search and rescue,
humanitarian operations, and others
as may subsequently be agreed; and
(v) to develop, over the longer term,
forces that are better able to operate
with those of the members of the
North Atlantic Alliance.
35. Slighfly dffierent from the NACC, the PFP
has been designed to provide the partners with an
opportunity to develop progressively closer rela-
tions with the alliance on the basis of their own
interest and actual perforrnance.
36. It is also noted that, although the PFP does
not provide the formal security guarantee of
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, the frame-
work document contains an article similar to
Article 4 providing for a commitment to consult
with any active participant if a partner perceives a
threat to its territorial integuty, political indepen-
dence or security.
37. In order to carry out the military co-ordina-
tion and planning needed for the implementation
of PFP prograrnmes, a Co-ordination Cell has
been established at Mons, near SHAPE, where
representatives of the participating countries are
now taking offrce. Liaison offices for NACC/PFP
partners are being established in permanent facili-
ties at NAIO's headquarters in Brussels.
38. The framework document, which is a
public text, common to all partners and setting out
the objectives of the prograflrmeo has at present
(October 1994) been signed by 23 countries. Of
these, 14 partners have submitted their presenta-
tion document which addresses the political and
military aspects of the partnership, provides an
indication of the co-operative activities and indi-
cates military forces and other assets available for
PFP activities. With four partners, an individual
partnership prograrnme has been developed.
39. A Political Military Steering Committee(PMSC) has been established to facilitate the
implementation and, if need be, co-ordination of
the different individual programmes.
40. The PFP could eventually lead to member-
ship for some parfiier states although it is empha-
sised that this is not an automatic consequence of
a country's decision to participate. knplementa-
tion of the PFP has only just begun and NAIO and
its partners should allow time to bring it to frui-
tion. While emphasising that a future enlargement
of the organisation to include Cenfral and Eastern
European countries is not excluded, most NATO
member states think that it would be premature to
set a timetable for this process. Enlargement, it is
said, will have to be co-ordinated with Russia and
it should be done only if it improved stability in
Europe. It is also noted that at present any deci-
sion to enlarge would, for a number of reasons,
involve a choice to include some nations, exclu-
ding others. Ratification of a limited enlargement
by the 16 member states might not be a smooth
and swift process and there might even be divi-
sions between members over the fundamental
issues at stake. A premature discussion of enlar-
gement issues might also lead to divisive debates
over the r6le of Russia and its thoughts and ambi-
tions and jeopardise a difEcult but very important
and precious process of co-operation with Russia.
(c) Combinedioint taskforces and
the trunsfomwtian of NATO
41. A major step forward on the road towards
the creation of operational capabilities for WEU
was taken attheNAIO summitmeeting in Brussels
on 10th-11th January 1994.
42. At this summit meeting, it was decided that
the alliance's organisation and resources would be
adjusted so as to facilitate the development of
WEU as the defence component of the European
Union. It was also stated that the alliance stood
ready to make collective assests available, on the
basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Coun-
cil, for WEU operations.
43. In their declaration, the heads of state and
of government further said: o' We also will need to
strengthen the European pillar of the allianse 6y
facilitating the use of our military capabilities for
NATO and European/WEU operations... o'To
improve, among other things co-operation with
WEU and to reflect the emerging European secu-
rity and defence identity, they endorsed " the
concept of combined joint task forces as a means
to facilitate contingency operations, including
operations with participating nations outside the
alliance ".
4. The North Atlantic Council, with the advice
of the NATO military authorities, was directed to
develop this concept and establish the necessary
capabilities. In co-ordination with WEU, it would
work on implementation in a manner that would
provide " separable but not separate " military
capabilities that could be employed by NAIO or
WEU.
45. The CJTF plan calls upon the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe and Supreme Allied
Commander Atlantic to designate a notional
general officer and headquarters sffi that could
be drawn out of the NATO integrated structure.
NATO " would then deploy them to a theafte of
operations for the purpose of conducting the com-
mand and confrol of a contingency. "
46. In an early working definition, military
authorities at NAIO defined a CJTF headquarters
as a deployable, multinational, multiservice head-
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quarters of variable size, formed to commandjoint forces of NAIO and, possibly, non-NAIO
nations, for the purpose of conducting peace ope-
rations outside the territory of NATO. A NAIO
CJTF headquarters could also be detached for
European-led (WELD operations. It is assumed that,
for the compositiol of a CJTF headquarters, ele-
ments will be drawn from CINCEM AFSOUTH
and AFNORTHWEST.
47. In the Kirchberg declaration of 9th May
I994,the WEU Council stated that:
'o They welcomed the summit's endorse-
ment of the principle that collective assets
and capabilities of the alliance can be made
available for WEU operations in order to
strengttren WEU as the defence component
of the European Union and as the means to
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlan-
tic A1liance. They underlined that the
modalities for making these available
should preserve WEU's own planning pro-
cedures and capabilities.
Ministers stressed the importance of work
under way in WEU on the WEU-related
aspects of the adaptation of the alliance
structures. In order to enhance WEU's
ability to carry out the tasks defined in the
Petersberg declaration, Ministers endorsed
the approach to identify the assets and
capabilities required to perform the neces-
sary military functions.
Ministers underlined the importance of co-
ordination with the alliance on the imFle-
mentation of the CJTF concept and the
definition of separable but not separate
military capabilities so as to ensure their
effective use where appropriate by WEU,
and in that case under its command.
While recalling their commitment to
strengthen the operational capabilities of
WEU, they also agreed that WEU would
benefit from careful management of
resources as well as existing standardised
procedures.
Ministers requested the Permanent Council
to take discussions on these matters for-
ward as fast as possible with a view to the
timely presentation of joint positions into
the process of consultation in the alliance. "
48. The final communiqu6 of the North Atlan-
tic Council at lstanbul, 9th June 1994, made it
clear that little progress had been made on this
subject:
" Close co-operation and co-ordination
between NATO and WEU will continue to
be developed in accordance with principles
of complementarity and ftansparency. The
summit decisions have set the course for
our co-operation, including the readiness of
the alliance to make its collective assets
available, on the basis of consultations in
the North Atlantic Council, for WEU ope-
rations undertaken by the European allies
in pursuit of their common foreign and
security policy. "
49. After thorough preparation by a specific
CJTF political-military working group, on 29th
June 1994, WEU tabled a document with its gui-
ding principles for the implementation of the
CJTF concept. Since then, little progress has been
made and no decisions regarding this subject were
taken at the Seville meeting of NAIO's defence
ministers on 28th-30th September 1994.
50. Initially, it rias hoped that final conclusions
on the CJTF concept_ could be presented to
NAIO's defence ministers by the end of 1994, but
in view of the slow progress being made, only an
interim report will be presented. Final decisions
are now expected to be taken in late spring 1995.
51. It was pointed out in an earlier Assembly
reportta that CJTF will rnake little sense for WEU
if the organisation fails to create the appropriate
political-military infrastructure to deal with it
effectively. Even if some progress has been made,
existing infrastructure is still largely ad hoc.
52. For command and control of operations as
envisaged in the CJTF concept, a strategic inter-
face is required between political and military
structures, an element still missing in WEU. The
prevailing command and control regulations in
WEU operations have been agreed on an ad hoc
basis, lacking universality.
53. While CJTFs were originally conceived as
mechanisms for providing command and control
for non-Article 5, out-of-uea operations, there is
a growing feeling in NATO that non-Article 5
operations may easily develop into Article 5 ope-
rations. Most NAIO authorities are therefore in
favour of robust CJTFs, which could also provide
complete command and control for a large-scale
alliance operation. This idea is running counter to
the original idea of having adaptable structures
and flexible procedures conceived to be used in
relatively minor but possibly complicated and
autonomous, multinational operations.
54. NAIO's SACEUR, General Joulwan, has
stated that he wants specific authority to approve
any operational requirements for a CJTF, but it
should be noted that this would leave any Euro-
pean operation without participation of the trans-
atlantic allies still completely dependent on the
decision of a United States commander. It really
seems illogical to have an American general as
14. The WEU Planning Cell, report submitted on behalf of
the Defence Committee by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Rap-
porteur, Document 1421.
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the linchpin of Europe's security and defence
identity.
55. ln recent negotiations, however, some pro-
gress has been made, inter alia because the United
States has relinquished its emphasis on the r6le of
major NATO command, while adopting a more
positive approach to the flexible modular concept.
56. It is also noted that CJTF makes little sense
without a European command, including a gene-
ral staff reflecting the armed forces commitments
of each of the participating nations with the pre-
paration of political decisions and operational
planning in the hands of the Europeans.
57. In order to solve a number of these and
other outstanding questions, it has been proposed
to start experimental exercises with CJTF general
staffs.
58. Altogether it is quite clear that the Atlantic
Alliance quite naturally prefers to maintain exis-
ting structures insofar as possible, while among
Europeans there is insufficient consensus to pre-
sent a distinct and logical European view. In fact,
in negotiating the implementation of the CJTF
concept, WEU is working out details for its ope-
rational r6le while the basis for this r61e, a cohe-
rent European defence policy, has not yet been
established. Here again, with agreement on the
general principles of a future redistribution of
r6les and responsibilities, it appears difficult to
mobilise the consensus needed to put them into
practice.
(d.) France and NATO
59. In particular, since last year, France has
made certain moves in the direction of NATO,
indicating that it was prepared to give up some
long-standing taboos as regards this organisation.
60. The French Chief-of-Staff, Admiral Jacques
Lanxade, signed an agreement with SACEUR
enabling the French division in the European corps
to be placed under NATO command in certain cir-
cumstances. Also, since 1993, the French represen-
tation at NATO has been participating in meetings
of military organs which may have consequences
for French armed forces deployed in such opera-
tions as in former Yugoslavia.
61. At the end of September 1994, the French
Defence Ministet Frangois L6otard, attended a
meeting of NATO defence ministers in Seville for
the first time since France withdrew from the inte-
grated military structures of NATO. There should
be no misunderstandings regarding this develop-
ment in France's position towards NATO. France
will keep clear of NATO's integrated military
sffuctures and will decide on a case-by-case basis
whether it is appropriate for the defence minister
or the chief-of-staff to attend meetings of the
Atlantic Alliance's organs.
62. On lst July 1994, France created a French
military mission under General Patrick Woillez at
CINCNORTHWEST, the Commander-in-Chief
Allied Forces Western Europe, at High-Wycombe,
which combines the former CINCNORTH'5and
CINCUKAIR'6 in the framework of the restructu-
ring of the different allied commands in Europe.
63. In 1993, France had already created a mili-
tary mission with CINCSOUTH, the Commander-
in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe in
Naples, some of whose units are involved in
monitoring the embargo against Serbia and Monte-
negro in the Adriatic.
64. Since summer l994,France also has a mili-
tary mission with CINCENT, Commander-in-
Chief Allied Forces Central Europe in Brunssum.
65. At the same time, it should be noted that the
increased French participation in NATO is closely
linked with the implementation of NAIO's January
1994 decisions to adapt its structures and to make
arrangements which should enable WEU to act on
its own, making use of NAIO assets without
being subjected to NATO command.
66. France considers the possibility of joint
action with the transatlantic partners as being of
great importance for the security of the European
continent. Shared values and solidarity are the
foundations of the Atlantic Alliance which are
still vital.
67. However, it should be noted, as stated by
the French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur'7,
that the alliance cannot do everything. It should
not stand in the way of a proper European defence
identity and should leave room for Europeans to
act on their own if they wish and are able to do so.
68. If the United States and Canada wish to act
together with their European allies, then NATO is
the appropriate framework. In that case, France
would not hesitate to co-operate, but for France to
be fully available, two conditions must be met:
- 
NATO shouldbe transformed, in particu-
lar in the field of peace-keeping, where
the usual mechanisms of the integrated
structure cannot be used, along the lines
decided by the alliance's summit mee-
ting in January 1994;
- 
member states must be prepared to
deploy their forces in joint action in
order to defend peace and liberty should
the need arise.
15. Commander-in-Chief North Europe, commanding the
allied forces of Norway and the Baltic coast.
16. Commander-in-Chief United Kingdom Air Force, com-
manding the airforce of the United Kingdom, attached to
NATO.
17. Address of the French Prime Ministet Edouard Balla-
dur, at the IHEDN on 8th September 1994.
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III. Conference on Securily and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE)
69. What has become of the CSCE's r6le after
the signing of the Charter of Paris in November
1990 and the many initiatives taken since then to
strengthen the CSCE process and to enhance its
r6le?
70. Apparently, in recent years the CSCE has
not been able to play the key r6le attributed to it
after the collapse of the Berlin wall.
71. What has happened and what are its pros-
pects at present?
72. Indeed, after the signing of the Helsinki
Final Act in 1975, in particular the " third basket "
with its focus on human rights, it has been a key
instrument in the unravelling of the dictatorship in
the Soviet Union and its firm control of its War-
saw Pact allies. However, once that process was
accomplished, expectations of its rdle in main-
taining peace and stability in Europe have been
far too high.
73. It should be noted that despite many efforts
made in the recent past, the CSCE's core structure
has remained weak. Its different institutions are
scattered all over Europe, the permanent staff is
far too small to provide internal strength and
continuity and the position of its Secretary-General
is such that this official has only administrative
responsibilities and no real authority.
74. Recent history has demonstrated that it has
only been able to play a useful r6le in crises or
conflicts where both parties were convinced that
consultations and negotiations were the only pos-
sible way to f,rnd a satisfactory solution.
75. In fact, while theoretically it has a unique
potential for an effective r6le in the newly inde-
pendent states of the former Soviet Union, this has
come to almost nothing because of the attitude of
Russia which is clearly determined to re-establish
its influence in what it calls its oo near abroad ", to
name only Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. A
notable exception should be made for the success-
ful CSCE missions in Estonia and Latvia, where it
helped defuse tension between ethnic Russians
and the indigenous population, but here clearly
both parties had understood that there was no
other solution.
76. In the preparatory negotiations for the
CSCE summit in Budapest (30th November 
- 
1st
December 1994), Russia had proposed the crea-
tion of a CSCE Security Council with permanent
seats including a veto right as well as a system
under which limited groups of states would handle
issues of direct concern to them. Furthermore,
Russia had proposed that the CIS be recognised as
equivalent to the CSCE, NAIO and the European
Union, and that Russia or CIS peace-keeping acti-
vities be supported by the rest of the CSCE.
77. It soon appeared that these proposals were
not supported by a majority of other CSCE mem-
ber states.
78. Speaking at the opening of the CSCE
review conference in Budapest on 10th October
1994,Mr. Yuri Ouchakov, the head of the Russian
delegation, said that the CSCE should be the
" major moving force in European security " but
that there was no need to set up a " hierarchical
system ". Apparently, Russia has understood that
there is little chance of transforming the CSCE
into Europe's most powerful security structure
with the CIS, NAIO and WEU subordinated to it.
The present review conference will provide an
important indication of the success or failure of
Russia's diplomatic offensive.
79. It is known that Russia is seeking interna-
tional support for its peace-keeping operations in
its near abroad, where it recently has been playing
at both arsonist and fireman. In particular, Russia
is asking for a CSCE mandate to act as mediator
and peace-keeper in disputes in former Soviet
states.
80. On this specific issue, the policy of both
European countries and the United States has
been particularly ambiguous and unhelpful. It
seems that no one is prepared to give Russia a free
hand in these matters, but on the other hand it is
quite clear that neither Western European states
nor the United States are prepared to send their
soldiers to Tajikistan to co-operate with Russian
troops in what is, to say the least, a doubtful
peace-keeping mission.
81. The United States Ambassador to the Uni-
ted Nations, Mrs. Madeleine Albright, approved
Russia's peace-keeping r6le within the CIS, while
stressing that it fell short of the best solution for
settling disputes in the region. She stated that the
burden of proof was on Russia to demonstrate that
what it sees as peace-keeping activities are benign,
but she made it clear that the United States was
prepared to accept the continued presence of
Russian peace-keeping forces in the more volatile
republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
82. According to Mrs. Albright, it would be
preferable for the United Nations to police the
trouble spots in the former Soviet Union, but she
added that this was impractical because of the
demands on its resources't.
83. One month later, at the CSCE review
conference, the United States delegate, Sam
Brown, said that if Russia wanted international
approval for such peace-keeping activities, it
would have to be genuinely and independently
11
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invited to intervene in conflicts and its interven-
tion would have to be for a limited duration and
with clear goals.
84. Germany, speaking on behaH of the Euro-
pean Union, proposed strengthening the CSCE by
suggesting members use its conflict-resolution
mechanisms.
85. Altogether, it seems that the most promi-
sing part of the CSCE's activities may be conflict-
prevention. In this field, the CSCE has established
a number of procedures and mechanisms intended
to provide early warning of tensions of any kind
which may lead to crisis or conflict. An important
element of early warning within the CSCE frame-
work is the 'o intensive use of regular, in-depth
political consultations " for which the possibi-
lities were expanded with the establishment, in
December 1993, of the CSCE's Permanent Com-
mittee in Vienna, which now meets at least once a
week in a formal session. The two-yearly review
conference, such as the present conference in
Budapest, also offers an opportunity to examine
possible violations of CSCE commitments and
the degree of implementation of confidence- and
security-building measures can also serve as an
early warning indicator.
86. The CSCE High Commissioner on Natio-
nal Minorities plays an important r6le with his
two-fold mission, on the one hand of trying to
contain and de-escalate tensions concerning
minority issues and on the other alerting the
CSCE whenever such tensions threaten to deve-
lop to such a level that he would not be able to
contrin them with the means at his disposal.
87. The conclusion of a European stability
pact, which is now being negotiated at different
regional round table conferences, will contribute
another important element in the CSCE conflict-
prevention mechanism.
88. On the other hand, it should be emphasised
here that in the timely exchange of information
over rising tensions, early consultations over pos-
sible crisis situations and efforts to prevent
conflicts, European states, also within WEU, have
an individual responsibility which they cannot
simply pass on to the CSCE and it would seem that
in this respect there is still room for improvement.
IV, The situalion in Russia
(a) Posilbn of the armedtorces in Russia
89. In Russia, the military accounts for some
1.7 million men and women; police and paramili-
tary account for another 1 million. During the
Soviet era, the country was militarised to a high
degree and it is well known that the industry's
best plants were geared to produce weaponry,
while the best engineers, technicians and scien-
tists were set to work on military output and
research.
90. There can be little wonder that the legacy of
this huge defence machine is causing numerous
problems for the present government. lts main
tasks in this field are to redefine the r6le of the
Russian military in the post-cold war world, to
restructure the armed forces and to convert the
indusflry from being defence oriented towards one
responding to a civilian consumer market. A frst
step was taken recently with the publication of a
new military doctrine.
9I. Notwithstanding its present-day problems,
Russia still regards itself as a superpower and a
regional leader. On the other hand, it feels liable
to be isolated by surrounding states, wlnerable
and deprived of protection. Naturally, it is there-
fore frrying to protect itself by concluding agree-
ments with the newly independent former Soviet
republics to have their borders policed by Russian
troops as well as by native border guards.
92. Isolation from the international community
from which it is expecting help and support in the
process of transforming the counfiry's economy
and society would be disastrous for Russia. This
is a good reason why both the government and the
military are interested in international co-opera-
tion, be it on a multi- or bilateral basis.
93. On the other hand there are concerns that
positive public declarations, in particular in the
field of disamrament, are not always followed up
by action. Recently, on 16th September 1994,the
Clinton administration decided to put off new
strategic arms reduction talks with Russia because
of uncertainties of reform in Russia and the slow
pace of nuclear weapons reductions. It should be
noted indeed that the START tr reaty has not yet
been ratified. On 28th September, President
Clinton and President Yeltsin agreed to speed up
the timetable for the 1993 START II agreement,
saying that their countries would begin to dis-
mantle the warheads as soon as that agreement
was ratified, but this can barely be called a new
development'e.
94. The United States administration is also
suspicious that Russia is still concealing its efforts
to develop binary chemical weapons, despite its
pledge in an understanding on chemical weapons
reached between the United States and Russia in
1989 to disclose details of its poison gas program-
me to the United States. Apparently, Russia also
has problems in devising an effective plan to
destroy its huge 40 000 ton stock of chemical
weapons agents20.
International Herald Tribune, 29th September 1994.
lnternational Herald Tribun e, 24th Jtne 1994.
19.
20.
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95. Most recently, on 18th October L994, the
Chairman of the State Duma's Committee on
Questions of Geopolicy, Victor U. Ustinov, stated
that preparations for destroying the stock were
" slack and inefficient ". He said that no destruc-
tion technology had been fully developed and that
there was no central management nor conftol of
the programme. Storehouses may be completely
inadequate within five years. Mr. Ustinov also
suggested that co-operation in this field with the
United States might have to be intensified. The
Defence Committee planned to ask President
Yeltsin to speed up the submission of draft laws
on chemical disarmament.
96. For the time-being, conscription will be
maintained even though there is widespread eva-
sion, but there are not enough financial resources
to implement the long-term objective of creating a
professional army. At present, there is a huge
oversupply of officers and generals compared to
other ranks while the officers often remain badly
housed and sporadically paid.
97. On 31st August 1994, the last Russian
troops left Estonia and Latvia under an earlier
agreement which had been negotiated with some
difficulty. While at the peak of its power, the
Soviet Union had about 350 000 troops stationed
at over I 000 military bases in the three Baltic
states, then an integral part of the empire. Russia
will now leave only 210 military behind to dis-
mantle the nuclear submarine base at Paldiski in
Estonia and about 300 at the Skrunda radar instal-
lation in Latvia up until the end of the century.
98. This does not mean, however, that all
problems between Russia and these two Baltic
states have been solved. Most Latvians are not
satisfied with the continuing presence of Russian
military at Skrunda, Russia is accusing Latvia of
discriminating against Russian citizens in its citi-
zenship law and there is no final agreement over
the question whether Estonia will grant residency
to the 10 000 retired Russian military personnel
on Estonian soil. Moreover, Russia and Estonia
are still involved in a dispute over their common
border.
99, Also at the end of August, the last Russian
soldiers left German soil where, before the collapse
of the Berlin wall, 400 000 Soviet troops had been
stationed.
100. With the accomplishment of these troop
withdrawals, it is the frst time now since 1939
that Russia has no soldiers west of its state bor-
ders which are roughly the same as those it had
three centuries ago.
101. It goes without saying that these inevitable
consequences of the end of the cold war have cau-
sed some uneasy feelings in the ranks of both
politicians and military in Russia.
102. All in all, some 640 000 military of the for-
mer Red Army have been withdrawn from Cenfral
and Eastern Europe and now independent former
Soviet republics since 1990, of which around
240 000 came back to Russia in 1994. With little
to do and often non-existant or insufficient hous-
ing, chaos and general discontent is increasing in
the armed forces.
103. Morale in the armed forces is said to be
low. Budget cuts have limited the number of exer-
cises and the state of readiness is thought to be
low.
lM. A recent extensive survey of Russia's
senior military officers, caried out for the Ger-
man Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, has clearly demons-
trated that the military do not feel at ease with
Russia's place in the world and with their own
place in Russia. Although they do not endorse the
more exfreme nationalist politicians and parties,
they are overwhelmingly in favour of a strong
hand to guide the state and evidently feel that such
a hand is lacking at present.
105. In populariry ratings, President Yeltsin sco-
red a little over 25Vo with a disapproval rating of
507o, while Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev,
scored 20Vo with a disapproval rating of more
than 50Vo. Most military were very pessimistic
over the immediate future with possibilities of
uprisings, strikes and a putsch but few foresaw a
return to socialism, the cold war or a planned
economy. Understandably, the most popular
foreign potcy goal, endorsedby 55Vo, was the re-
establishment of Russia as a great power enjoying
respect throughout the worldzr.
106. Traditional loyalty and subservience to
civilian leadership has not yet been broken, but
the danger is greater than before.
107. The government publicly suspects a num-
ber of generals and other military of misappro-
priation of funds attributed to the armed forces. It
is said that frequently billions (milliards) of
roubles disappear. A recently published report of
the Deputy Military General Attorney, Grigori
Nossov, mentions the names and other details of
military accused of fraud, embezzlement, active
corruption and misappropriation of funds 2.
108. Russia's top brass is losing its grip over
regional commanders throughout the former
Soviet Union. Its efforts to oust the Commander
of the 14th army in the Trans Dniesfr enclave on
three different occasions in August 1994, remu-
ned unsuccessful, to name only one exampler.
Financial Times, 8th September 1994.
Le Figaro, 30th August 1994.
Financial Times, 6th September 1 994.
21.
22.
23.
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(b) Delence spending
109. At the end of June l994,the Russian budget
for 1994 passed both Houses of Parliament.
According to initial figures, total spending would
amount to 194.5 trillion roubles ($ 97 .25 billion),
with military spending fixed at about 40 rillion
roubles ($ 20 billion). The parliament, supported
by the Russian military, had demanded a military
budget of 55 trillion roubles, an amount the mili-
tary consider essential to maintain basic effective-
ness. Initially, the military had insisted on a bud-
get of 80 rillion roubles.
110. According to the government, the 40 trillion
roubles would include 22.I ttllton for basic mili-
tary financing, 8.5 trillion for arms purchases,
4.8 trillion for capital construction, 2.5 trillion for
scientific research and testing and 1.9 trillion for
pensions2o. At the end of September 1994, the
Russian budget, with its income cut almost in half
because of a huge shortfall in tax revenues, again
came under heavy attack from the military. They
say that lack of money is causing Russia to default
on its commitments to disarm, because only 22Vo
of the planned budget for disarmament had been
received.
111. According to Colonel General Alexander
Kuznetsov, in the first nine months of 1994, the
Defence Ministry had received only 14.6 trillion
roubles, or 53Vo of the 27.2 trillion roubles it
should have received. In a hearing before the State
Duma's Defence Committee, the situation in the
defence industries was called catasffophic. With
95Vo of the defence plants having stopped work-
ing and no new weapons research work being
financed, the Defence Ministry would not receive
a newly developed piece of equipment until the
year 2000r.
ll2. The 1994-95 edition of the IISS Military
Balance put the complaints of the military into
perspective, asserting that Russian defence bud-
gets have been effectively static in real terms
since 1992 with " perhaps a small increase in
1994 ". Contradicting official statistics which
show a real decline in defence budgets based on
the evidence of GDP decline statistics, the institute
has roughly doubled its previous estimates for
the 1992 and 1993 Russian defence budgets to
$74.6 billion and $ 76.6 billion, from $ 39.7 and
$ 29.1 billion respectively, by using a new measure
of purchasing-power parity. The figure provided
for the 1994 budget is $ 79 billion, adding that
even this estimate makes Russian military expen-
diture " in real terms substantially higher than that
of any counffy apart from the United States "26.
Financial Times, 25th-26th June 1994.
Financial Tlmes, 27th September 1994.
The Military Balance 1994-95, t ondon 1994.
113. It should also be noted that Russia has not
stopped all activities in the development and pro-
duction of new military equipment.
ll4. As a consequence of the START agree-
ments, there will be more emphasis on sea-based
strategic nuclear weapons. Russia is expected to
start the production of a new SSBN, a successor to
the Delta III, Delta IV and Typhoon class by the
end of this decade.
115. Recently, submarines of the Russian Nor-
thern Fleet have resumed their Atlantic Ocean
patrols from their Murmansk base. Icelandic
authorities stated that for the frst time for two
years these submarines have shown up in the seas
between lceland and the United Kingdom. Train-
ing purposes have been mentioned as the most
obvious reason for the resumption of these routine
patrol missions 2'. A recent Norwegian study
argues that Russia's northern fleet, based in the
Arctic, is emerging as the most important part of
the former Soviet navy".
116. ln 1993, the operating tempo of the most
modern classes of Russian SSNs and SSBNs did
not decline for the fnst time in six years. In the
same year, Russia launched four submarines and
another four are expected to be launched in 1994.
A new cruise missile will be in operation in the
next three or four years and several new anti-ship
missiles have been developed'e.
ll7. A new attack aircraft, the Su-34, made its
first flight at the end of 1993 30 and Mig is develo-
ping the MFI future air superiority fighter for the
Russian airforce. The funding for several other
aircraft development programmes has been made
available".
118. On the other hand, a shortage of fuel is
affecting the Russian airforce and the whole
training programme is only available for the best
pilots.
(c) Russia's relalians with irs near ahrood
119. A large part of the Russian political and
military elite is seeking ways to reassert the Rus-
sian authority to protect former Soviet republics
with Russia's armed forces, including its nuclear
arsenal. To that purpose, the Collective Security
Council of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) has endorsed a draft agreement for a
military alliance, to be submined to the CIS lea-
ders in early 1995. This military alliance is inten-
ded to provide a shield against " possible aggres-
sive intentions against all CIS participant states ".
NRC-Handelsblad, 26th August 1994.
Financial Times, 7th October 1994.
Jane's Defence Weekly, 2lstMay 1994.
Jane's Defence Weekly, 23rd Apil1994.
Jane's Defence Weekly, 9th April 1994.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
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The draft agreement calls for the eventual creation
of joint armed forces, collective peace-keeping
forces and a joint air defence system and would in
this way restore a cohesive, co-ordinated military
force under unified control and under Russia's
nuclear protection.
I20. At the same time, Konstantin Zatulin,
Chairman of the Russian parliament's Committee
for Commonwealth Affairs, is proposing a strate-
gic partnership between Russia and Ukraine,
hinting that if such partnership came about, the
issue of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament would not
be a top priority for Russia3'.
l2l. [t can be argued that Russia's frontiers with
the three Baltic states, apart from a still lingering
border dispute with Estonia, now have the same
legal status as other long-established international
frontiers such as those with Finland and Norway.
122. On the other hand, the exact status of
Russia's borders with the eleven former Soviet
republics linked with Russia in the CIS is still
fluid. Five of these eleven states 
- 
Georgia, Arme-
nia, Tajikistan, Kirgizstan and Turkmenistan 
-
have officially agreed to the stationing of Russian
troops on their territory. Others agree that they
share certain security interests with Russia, while
maintaining their attachment to strict sovereignty
and independence.
123. On 22nd September 1994, Yevgeny Pri-
makov, the head of Russia's foreign intelligence
service, publicly stated that the re-integration of
most of the former Soviet Union into the Com-
monwealth of Independent States was an undoub-
ted fact. He added: " If a negative attitude toward
this becomes accepted in western capitals, then it
could very adversely affect relations between
them and Moscow. " In the report which he
released on this subject, it is said that an economic
union of the CIS states is inevitable and a defence
and political union desirable, and that such unions
would safeguard the independent and democratic
development of these states. The report further
states that a federal structure would diminish the
threat of ethnic and interstate conflicts within the
CIS 33.
124. In fact, Russia's endeavours to reintegrate
all the former Soviet Republics except the three
Baltic states into the CIS, which was created
immediately after the Soviet Union's dissolution
in 1991, is clearly meeting with only a lukewarm
response from the other partners. The problems
are many-fold. Most of the newly independent
republics are tied to Russia hand and foot. They
lack financial resources, are dependent on Russia's
energy supplies and other natural resources, their
32. lnternational Herald Tribune,3lst August 1994.
33. Financial Times, 22nd September 1994 and Le Monde,
27th September 1994.
indusrial production is in shambles and Russia is
their natural trading partner. Still, they are reluc-
tant to hand over their national sovereignty to CIS
structures. On the other hand, there is Russia
which wishes to control the situation in what it
repeatedly calls its near abroad, partly also to
re-establish its former superpower status on the
Eurasian continent. There are clear signs that
Russia wants to retain control over the oil export
pipelines from vast energy reserves in the Caspian
sea region, while some observers assert that it
wants to re-exert control over the energy
resources of the former Soviet Union. At the same
time, it is aware that supporting other CIS repu-
blics and the establishment and maintenance of a
Russian rouble zone will cost money, which it
does not have. A full-blown fiscal crisis (in the
first nine months of 1994, the Russian federal
government collected onTy 37.37o of the tax and
other revenues it counted on receiving this year)
and the steep decline of the rouble in October
1994 ue clear indications of the chaotic economic
situation in the country.
125. At the last summit meeting of the twelve
CIS republics in Moscow on 21st October, a num-
ber of new political and economic agreements
were signed, but many of the participating states
expressed reservations and retained the right to
opt out of CIS agreements.
V The position of the Baltic states
126. After regaining independence in August
1991, the three Baltic states went through a tur-
bulent period in their new relationship with the
Soviet Union and later with Russia.
127. The withdrawal of all Russian troops by
31st August 1994 has heralded a new era for these
states. Many reports by international bodies,
amongst others the Council of Europe and the
CSCE, have refuted Russian allegations of infrin-
gement of human rights for Russian speakers in
the Baltic countries. Certainly, there are obvious
problems remaining to be overcome and the
Latvian legislation on citizenship is one of these.
128. At present, Russia has fully and wholly
recognised the independence of the Baltic states.
Any questioning of the integrity of the Baltic
states or any serious crisis in relations between
Russia and these states would no doubt have an
immediate impact on the overall relationship
between Russia and the West.
129. On the other hand, strong western support
for the efforts of these states to secure their inde-
pendence and to transform their economies and
societies is vital.
130. Understandably, the Baltic states are
making great efforts to enhance their security. The
15
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objective of all three is full membership of NATO
as soon as possible, but everyone knows that this
is unlikely to happen at short notice. Not only
because NATO would be reluctant to provide
security guarantees which it might not be able to
put into practice, but also because an extension of
NAIO's treaty area to the very borders of Russia
could play into the hands of Russian hardliners.
131. The next best solution for these countries
which they are now implementing is to forge
diplomatic and military ties which draw them into
the western sphere and out of Russia's orbit. In
fact, the Baltic defence strategy is to raise the
political price of any Russian interference.
1.32. All three are participating in the partnership
for peace and a Baltic battalion, which will be
trained by Scandinavian and British soldiers, is
being created for United Nations peace-keeping
operations.
133. In this framework, they have to completely
rebuild and reform their arrred forces. This is a
tall order, since there are no indigenous military
structures and there is a lack of equipment and
proper barracks. Moreover, most of the regular
officers have served in the Soviet arrned forces
and are used to a different military culture and
doctrine, not compatible with those of western
forces. The most urgent need of all three Baltic
states in the defence field is therefore to have their
military trained according to western standards.
134. A sensitive problem which has been pushed
to the backstage at present, but will return to a
more prominent position in the future is the situa-
tion of the Russian region of Kaliningrad, which
has common borders with Poland and Lithuania
and not with Russia. Kaliningrad is playing an
important r6le as a transit camp forRussian troops
which have been withdrawn from Central Euro-
pean countries.
135. Lithuania and Russia are now negotiating
transit arrangements for the transport of Russian
troops and equipment from Kaliningrad to the
mainland of Russia. This issue is causing acrimo-
nious debates in Lithuania.
136. With the exception of the Lithuanian
Democratic Labour Party and the Union of Poles,
all political groups represented in the Lithuanian
partament have demanded of President Algiradas
Brazauskas that no agreement be signed with
Russia on military nansit and that Lithuania limit
itself to the regulations which it had made earlier.
The CSCE might play a r6le in guaranteeing the
smooth pursuit of the operation.
137. On 27th September 1994, the representa-
tive of Lithuania raised this transit problem in
WEU's Permanent Council and asked the Council
to consider the possibility of making WEU obser-
vers available to monitor the transit alrangements
once they are agreed between Lithuania and Russia.
The proposal was fully supported by the represen-
tative of Poland. At that meeting, the Permanent
Council agreed to consult national capitals, but
since then no further news has filtered through.
138. Once this problem has been solved, one
might still wonder how the Kaliningrad area will
be able to subsist without direct land connections
with mainland Russia and without resources of its
own.
VI. The new dividing line in Europe
139. What about the Europe whole and free, so
much hailed in the London declaration of 1990? It
should be recognised now that this concept has
been over optimistic. Indeed, progress has been
made through efforts to create frameworks of co-
operation and consultation, but there is now an
understanding that Russia cannot be an integral
part of either NATO or the European Union, if
only because of its size. Both organisations would
collapse under the weight of Russia's membership.
140. Russia has also clearly understood that
there is no room for it in either of these organisa-
tions. It has tried in vain to subject them to a Euro-
pean superstrucnre 
- 
the CSCE in which it had
proposed a right of veto for itself.
l4l. Apparently there will be no all-encompas-
sing security system in Europe and there is no
denying that a new western and a new eastern
group of counties are emerging. On the one hand
there is the European Union with WEU which
will, in the not too distant future, gradually incor-
porate the Cenral and Eastern European countries
not belonging to the CIS. On the other hand there
is Russia and the now independent former Soviet
republics which are members of the CIS.
I42. The cenfral challenge for European secu-
rity is to make sure that this new and inevitable
dividing line will not develop into a new line of
confrontation. Vague rhetoric over the possibi-
lities of partnership will not help, even less if at
the same time this is accompanied by ambiguous
language over Russia's ambition to intervene in
the near abroad. A policy of words without
follow-up would only reinforce the idea that the
West is not really interested in security in the
former Soviet Union.
I43. In this constellation, NATO, the bulwark of
western co-operation, seems to be leaning
towards a r6le of mediator and all-encompassing
organisation, covering all states on both sides
with NACC and offering them an h la carte
co-operation of much wider scope with its PFP
programme.
144. The European Union and Western Euro-
pean Union have chosen a different policy. They
cannot and will not stretch further eastward
I6
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beyond the borders of the CIS, if only for reasons
of internal strength and political and economic
coherence. This policy was confirmed at a mee-
ting of twenty-two ministers for foreign affairs in
Luxembourg on 31st October 1994.
145. With the states of the CIS, however, they
should make sure to maintain the closest possible
relations in an atmosphere of full ransparency in
order to prevent any resurgence of alienation
while, at the same time, preparing a framework of
narrower relations which could come to fruition in
a more distant future when the present situation of
political and economic ffansformation in that part
of Europe has settled into a new balance.
146. It seems that the European Union, Western
European Union and NATO, in a natural way,
have developed different policies which are in no
way contradictory but rather complementary and
perfectly adapted to the situation today.
VII. Risks and threats to Earopean security
147. Many developments on the Eurasian conti-
nent and elsewhere after the fall of the Berlin wall
have demonstrated that, despite revolutionary
changes, the world has not become more secure
than before. Although by now the new risks and
threats to Western European security are suffi-
ciently well-known, it seems useful once again to
provide an overall review in the framework of the
present report.
(a) Balkans
148. It is no secret that the Balkans, with the
conflict in ex-Yugoslavia at the centre, will
remain an area of interest and instability for
many years to come. All the efforts of the contact
group (France, Germany, Russia, the United
Kingdom and the United States) to present a
peace agreement which would be acceptable to
the parties involved in the Bosnian conflict have
so far been in vain. It would seem that the situation
is still deteriorating and that violence is again the
only language of flrst and last resort between the
parties.
149. Moreover, the conflict has brought into the
open many debates and disagreements between
Europe and the United States and also between
NATO and the United Nations over the best way
to put an end to it and how to act and react in the
protection of humanitarian aid, own troops and
safe areas.
150. Apart from the violence raging in the Bos-
nian conflict, unrest is still simmering around
Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia, where frontiers
do not coincide with ethnic populations and where
minorities feel threatened by the ruling class.
151. Furthermore, no solution has yet been
found for those regions of the republic of Croatia
which are occupied and claimed by Serbs. At pre-
sent, there are rumours that a formal reconcilia-
tion between Belgrade andZagreb is under active
consideration, since President Milosevic has
come under sfong pressure from western coun-
tries and Russia to recognise the Croatian govern-
ment and acknowledge in principle Croatia's
territorial integrity 30. Recently, a dispute over
confiscated Italian properties and other claims of
the ltalian minority in the peninsula of Istria has
divided Italy, Slovenia and Croatia. Vojvodina, a
region in Serbia where around 300 000 Hunga-
rians are living, is now out of the limelight but it
may be a focus of attention at a later stage.
(b ) Minoririe s and frontien
152. Problems of minorities and frontiers in
Central Europe may remain on the agenda for
some time to come, but there are hopeful signs.
153. The new socialist-liberal coalition govern-
ment in Hungary has clearly stated its determina-
tion to obtain a historic reconciliation with its
neighbours, in particular Slovakia and Romania,
where, respectively, more than 500 000 and 1.7
million to over 2 million ethnic Hungarians live.
Immediately after coming to power in July 1994,
the Hungarian Prime Minister, Gyula Horn, paid a
visit to Bratislava in September. It is not yet clear,
however, what action will be taken by the new
Slovakian government.
L54. The Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs
paid a visit to Budapest in early September 1994
where he used conciliatory language while not
hiding the fact that negotiations between the two
countries would be long and complicated. Here as
well, the situation may become more complica-
ted, now that the ultra-nationalist Party of Roma-
nian National Unity has been included in the
government. So far, both Romania and Slovakia
have stipulated that the inviolability of frontiers
should be written into the bilateral agreements,
while Hungary claims guarantees for the rights of
minorities. According to the Hungarian Foreign
Minister, Laszlo Kovacs, Hungary would be pre-
pared to consider the question of minorities sepa-
rately in order to accelerate negotiations and to
mention it in an annex to ttre bilateral ffeaties.
155. The European stability pact, now being
negotiated and later to be inserted in the CSCE
framework, will certainly play an important r6le
in defusing possible tensions between Cenfral and
Eastern European states, especially as regards
minorities and frontiers.
34. Financial Times,
October 1994.
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(c) Medilerranean
156. The situation in the southern Mediter-
ranean is extremely volatile.
157 . In Algeria, since the cancellation in January
1992 of a general election which the fundamen-
talist Salvation Front was expected to win, an
armed Islamic power struggle between Islamic
fundamentalists has wrought havoc in the country
involving the violent death of thousands of civi
lians, military and police officers. While the Alge-
rian government says that l0 000 people have
been killed since the beginning of the conflict,
foreign experts provide estimates of up to 30 000.
158. In spite of more than two and a half years of
dour struggle, the government has not succeeded
in eliminating Islamists from Algerian politics
and eradicating armed Islamic groups. In Septem-
ber 1994, the government released some of the
leaders of the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF),
including the two most senior leaders, Abbasi
Madani and Ali Belhadj, from prison hoping that
they could give support to the objective of stop-
ping the violence. It is by no means clear, how-
ever, that these leaders can command the loyalty
of younger fundamentalists who have taken charge
of the armed revolt and until now there have been
no signs of the violence diminishing. It is no
secret that both the Islamic movement and the
government are divided over practically all the
main issues now at stake, and negotiations would
be long and difficult without there being any gua-
rantee of positive conclusions in sight.
159. Meanwhile, on29th October, the Algerian
President, Liamine Zdroua| publicly declared that
the government's efforts to start a dialogue with
the Islamist movement had failed, while accusing
the representatives of the ISF of having continued
to encourage terrorism and extremism. The Presi-
dent announced that presidential elections would
be organised before the end of 1995.
160. It remains to be seen how serious the divi-
sions within the Islamic movement are, but there
are signs that there is an increasing similarity with
the Afghan Islamic movement, which has divided
into different camps which fight each other. The
recent agitation by the Berber movement will cer-
tainly not ease the already tense situation in the
country.
161. In the neighbouring countries, Morocco and
Tunisia, the situation is still under control, but
understandably the governments of both countries
are extremely worried over developments in
Algeria. The governments of both countries are
reluctant to relax their hold or power for fear that
Algeria's political unrest might spread across the
border. The Algerian government's decision to try
and negotiate with the Islamic fundamentalists
has only increased these worries.
162. Libya is to a large degree still isolated from
the other North African countries, being suspected
of secret support for Islamic fundamentalist
movements. United Nations sanctions, imposed in
November 1993 after Libya failed to co-operate
with investigations of the PanAm and LI'IA disas-
ters over Lockerbie and Niger respectively are
troubling the rdgime of Colonel Kadhafi. The
country's annual oil revenues have plummeted
from $ 21 billion a decade ago to $ 6 billion at
present.
163. Egypt too has to cope with a rebellious and
violent campaign of Islamic fundamentalists
which the government, despite sustained efforts,
has not been able to quell.
164. Little progress is being made regarding the
situation in Western Sahara. In April 1994, the
pro-independence Polisario Front had agreed to
abide by United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tion 907 for organising a long-delayed referen-
dum on the territory's future before the end of
1994, but recently the process incurred new
delays because of Moroccan claims.
165. Although the five-country Arab Maghreb
Union35 held its delayed sixth Supreme Council
meeting in Tunis on 2nd and 3rd April 1994 with
a final communiqu6 stressing the need to continue
working towards the ultimate goal of Maghrebian
unity, it appears that, in practice, very little pro-
gress has been made.
166. A recent document of the Commission of
the European Union rightly says that political,
economic and social conditions in a number of
North African countries are sources of instability
leading to mass migration, fundamentalist extre-
mism, terrorism, drugs and organised crime. The
Commission has therefore launched a proposal to
create a Euro-Mediterranean economic area, akin
to the European economic area, set up with the
EFIA countries earlier in 1994.In this initiative,
the European Commission has proposed to more
than double the European Union's aid to help par-
ticipants restructure their economies. The target
date for a full Euro-Mediterranean free trade area
is 2010. Meanwhile, special association agree-
ments are being negotiated with Israel, Tunisia
and Morocco.
167. [t should be noted that North African coun-
tries are still wonied that they receive less atten-
tion from the European Union than the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe. ln 1993, all non-
European Union Mediterranean countries receiv-
ed 407 million ecus in aid, compared with
1.04 billion ecus for Central and Eastern Europe.
168. It seems, however, that with the present
volatile situation in mind, WEU cannot sit and
18
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wait to see what will happen next. It will have to
prepare for a situation which may give rise to
greater concern over Europe's southern flank than
is the case at present.
169. In its Luxembourg meeting on 9th May
1994, the WEU Council, after having stressed
" the importance of security and stability in the
Mediterranean basin for the security of Europe "
agreed " to develop the dialogue already initiated
with the Maghreb countries and to expand it to
Egypt and gradually to other non-WEU Mediter-
ranean states. "
170. This is all very well and the Council's
activity and intentions should certainly be wel-
comed, but one may question the effectiveness of
these modest steps, which are little more than an
exchange of information with the diplomatic
representatives of these countries in Brussels.
Moreover, the existing divisions and wide diffe-
rences of views among the abovementioned coun-
tries is almost a guarantee for low effectiveness
and little progress in this dialogue.
l7l. This should notdiscourage Europeans from
continuing their efforts in political dialogue and
discussions. The idea of creating a Conference on
Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean
(CSCM) in the mould of the successful CSCE
should not be discarded, even if its establishment
may take a long time.
172. On the other hand, Europe will also have to
prepare itself for an even more volatile situation
in North Africa, which may result in a direct
threat to its southern flank which traditionally has
been its soft under-belly. Security and defence
policy is notjust dialogue, it is also vigilance and
preparedness to act physically if circumstances
demand.
173. The French-Italian-Spanish initiative for a
reaction force in this region should be encouraged
and a link should be established between this
force and other forces answerable to WEU which
could reinforce its operations.
(d) The Caucasus
(i) Georgia
174. The war between Georgia and Abkhazian
separatists is only one example of how the mili-
tary have taken control in different conflicts on
the territory of the former Soviet Union. While
Georgia's leader, Eduard A. Shevardnadze, was
seeking an accommodation with the Abkhazian
separatists, his Minister of Defence, Tengiz Kito-
vani, invaded Abkhazia without his approval. The
tide turned when in September 1993 the Abkha-
zians, supplied with weaponry money and opera-
tional planning by Russians, drove the Georgians
back to their own territory. It is generally believed
that hard-liners in the Russian military authorised
support to Abkazians at the time when President
Yeltsin was entangled in a serious conflict with
hard-liners in the Russian parliament.
175. The only way for Georgia to make Russia
stop giving covert aid to Abkhazian separatists
was to agree to accept permanent Russian military
bases on its soil. At the end of June 1994, Presi-
dent Shevardnadze had to accept 3 000 Russian
troops to monitor the border between Georgia and
Abkhazia. On 2lst July 1994, the presence of
these troops was legitimised by the United
Nations Security Council, allegedly in exchange
for Russian support for an invasion of Haiti by the
United States with the backing of the United
Nations.
(ii) Nagorno-Karabakh
176. The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is
still not solved, and it is obvious that a solution
can be found only if it has the full agreement of
Russia.
177. Recently, negotiations between President
Geidar Aliev of Azerbaijan and President Levon
Ter-Petrossian of Armenia meeting in Moscow
almost reached agreement on a peaceful settle-
ment. Parties involved in the conflict have now
asked for an international peace-keeping force to
police a cease-fre, but there are still some issues
outstanding. There is no agreement over when
Armenian forces will withdraw from Azeri areas
seized outside the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave,
over the final status of the enclave and over the
exact size and composition of the peace-keeping
force.
178. A request for a peace-keeping force has
now been made at a CSCE meeting in Prague on
30th September which could lead to the first
CSCE peace-keeping operation.
I79. At the beginning of October, political
unrest caused President Aliyev to impose a state
of emergency followed by the dismissal of Prime
Minister Suret Huseinov who was accused of
siding with opposition forces trying to incite a
coup.
180. Whatever may happen in the Caucasus,
Russia will always make sure that it will keep a
firm hand on developments in this strategically
important region with oil and rising Islamic fun-
damentalism as important ingredients.
181. Here, it should be recalled that in Septem-
ber Azerbaijan signed an $8 billion oil production
agreement with a consortium of western oil com-
panies to drill in the Azeri section of the Caspian
Sea. Following this agreement, Russia has propo-
sed the establishment of a multinational co-ordi-
nating committee to decide on the exploitation of
oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea to which,
19
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it stated, Kazakhstan and Tlrkmenistan had already
agreed 36. At the initiative of Russia, on l2th Octo-
ber 1994, representatives ofall the countries sur-
rounding the Caspian Sea met in an effort to reach
agreement over claims to the region's natural
resources3T.
(iiil Chechnya
I82. Russian efforts to regain control over
Chechnya have so far been less successful. Three
years ago, Dzhokar Dudayev, a former Soviet air-
force general, declared Chechnya's independence
from Moscow. President Yeltsin is now openly
supporting Mr. Dudayev's opponents with money
and arms, partly because he cannot tolerate fla-
grant defiance, but also in order to pre-empt his
nationalist critics by appearing tough against
independence in other restive regions, to name
only Tatarstan and Bashkiria. Moreover, all three
autonomous republics mentioned here are oil-
producing regions. It should be noted, however,
that the most conspicuous opponent of Mr.
Dudayev is Ruslan Khasbulatov, the former
speaker of Russia's parliament, who was released
from prison in February last.
183. Russian military forces in neighbouring
regions have been put on full combat alert to pre-
vent the Chechen conflict from spreading to other
parts of the Caucasus. Recently, the Russian depu-
ty Prime Minister, Sergei Chalcai, has stated that
in Chechnya, being part of Russia, ffoops of the
Minisbry of Interior should re-establish order3E.
184. On several occasions, both political and
military leaders in Russia have called for a
renegotiation of the CFE Treaty in view of the
unstable situation in the Caucasus. The Defence
Minister, Pavel Grachev, has stated that the
amount of equipment authorised " in no way cor-
responds to the military needs entailed by an ade-
quate defence capability ". The Minister also
noted that according to the treaty, after 1995
Russia will be limited to " 700 tanks, 580 armou-
red troop transport vehicles, and I 280 artillery
systems for the military regions of Leningrad and
the Northern Caucasus ". However, in his view,
these regions require about I 500 tanks, 3 000
armoured transport vehicles, and 2 100 artillery
systems of which 600,2 200 and 1 000 respecti-
vely would be required in the Caucasus.
185. NATO has stated that it is against a renego-
tiation of the Eeaty, but that, in accordance with
Russia and the states of the Caucasus, changes
would be possible, provided that the global
ceiling authorised by the treaty for these countries
were not exceeded.
Financial Times, 27th September 1994.
Financial Times, 12th October 1994.
Le Monde, 28th September 1994.
(e) Tajikistan
186. Russia has deployed a 25 000 strong mili-
tary force in Tajikistan, mainly in this country's
southern region on the border with Afghanistan.
187. The Russian ftoops have been instrumental
in overthrowing a coalition of intellectuals, demo-
crats and Islamics which had come to power in
autumn 1992 and re-installing a government of
old guard hard-liners from the previous commu-
nist adminisffation under the interim head of state,
lmamaLi Rakhmonov. In this power struggle, tens
of thousands have been killed while many others
have fled the counfiry into Afghanistan.
188. At present, Russia claims that these roops
play an important r6le in protecting the former ter-
ritory of the Soviet Union against Islamic funda-
mentalist forces from Afghanistan, but more proba-
bly they have become heavily tangled in the power
struggle between different clans inside Tajikistan.
189. Meanwhile, several rounds of negotiations
have been held in Islamabad between represen-
tatives of the Tajik government and opposition
covering such issues as a pennanent cease-fre,
the return of refugees from Afghanistan and
Tajikistan's government system. A temporary
cease-fue monitored by United Nations military
observers came into force on 19th October. On
6th November 1994,Imamali Rakhmonov was
elected president in elections which were not
recognised and boycotted by the opposition and to
which the United Nations and the CSCE declined
to send observers.
(fl Uloaine
190. The election in July 1994 of Leonid Kuch-
ma as the President of Ukraine, who during his
election campaign had promised closer links with
Russia, seems indeed to have a positive influence
on the relations between the two states.
191. On 18th August, Russia and Ukraine reach-
ed an agreement on the repayment of Ukraine's
debt to Russia for the supply of gas. In early
September, a number of agreements were prepa-
red for signature on the occasion of President
Boris Yeltsin's visit to Kiev. Some agreements
were prepared on economic and trade issues, but
Ukraine also stated that it would agree to split the
on-shore facilities of the Black Sea fleet. This
agreement would clear the way for the solution of
questions which remained after the basic agree-
ment on the division of the Black Sea fleet,
concluded in April 19943".
192. It should be pointed out, however, that
Ukraine has clearly stated that it does not intend to
change is status as an associate member of the CIS
36.
37.
38.
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economic union, wishing to keep its disance from
a closer union with this Russian dominated body.
193. Mr. Kuchma's election may also lead to an
easing of tension in Crimea, the autonomous
Ukrainian peninsula which earlier in 1994 elected
the separatist Yivu Meshkov as its President.
Crimea is dominated by ethnic Russians for
whom there seems to be little distinction between
calls for independence and reintegration in Russia
of which Crimea was part until 1954. At present it
appears, however, that Russia is giving priority to
good relations with Ukraine and its new leader-
ship, rather than support a Crimean secessionist
movement. It seems that this new reality has been
understood by Crimean politicians.
(g) Moldova and the Tians-Dniostr regian
194. The republic of Moldova which declared its
independence in August 1991, shortly after the
failed coup in Moscow, is still facing a multitude
of threats to its very existence as an independent
state. While two-thirds of its population is of
Romanian origin, the idea of reunification with
Romania is no longer topical. With no other
important markets for its agricultural and indus-
trial production and completely dependent on
Russia for its energy, Moldova had no choice but
to integrate into the economic union of the CIS in
October 1993.
195. The Gagauz, Turkish-speaking christians
living in the south of the counbry, have obtained a
statute of autonomy. No solution has yet been
found for the Trans-Dniesff region inhabited by
the largest part of the Russian and Ukrainian
minority. This region declared its independence
and, after a short but violent armed conflict with
the cenfral authorities of Moldova, is now being
protected by the 14th Russian army.
196. At present, Russia is keeping its 14th army
in Moldova without any formal agreement or any
other accord on military bases. Repeated efforts
of the Russian government to replace the com-
manding general of the 14th Army have all been
in vain. One may doubt whether the government
has full control over this part of its armed forces.
197. On 21st October 1994, at the CIS summit
meeting in Moscow, the Russian and Moldovan
Prime Ministers agreed on the withdrawal of the
Russian 14th army from the breakaway Trans-
Dniesft region by 1997 .It is by no means certain,
however, whether this agreement will be ratified
and implemented.
198. The Moldovan government has declared
that Trans-Dniestr could be given the statute of
autonomous region while sharing a common
foreign policy and armed forces, but Trans-Dniestr
itself insists on being an independent republic.
(h) Proliferalion of nuclear weopons
199. In the spring of 1995, a conference is to be
held in New York to decide, in accordance with
Article X 2 of the fieaty on the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons OIPT), whether the treaty should
'o continue in force indefinitely, or shall be exten-
ded for an additional fixed period or periods ". The
decision on extending the ftary must be taken by
a majority of the present 164 signatories. Many
have cast doubts on the effectiveness of the NPT,
but it should be noted that at present only three
countries (lndia, lsrael and Pakistan), which have
not signed the NPT, are " threshold " or'o suspect'o
states meaning that either they have a nuclear
weapon or are actively developing one. Algeria,
another potential o' suspect " has now promised tojoin the NPT and has accepted a safeguard agree-
ment for its nuclear reactors.
200. The nuclear status of lsrael may be consi-
dered as potentially the most destabilising since it
has incited a number of Arab states not to ratifu the
chemical weapons convention. These states may
also refuse to support NPT extension unless the
United States can convince Israel to denuclearise.
20L. The breaking up of the Soviet Union into a
series of new independent republics has created
new nuclear weapon states with an uncertain sta-
tus as regards the NPT. It seems, however, that
most of the problems caused by this development
not provided for in the NPT have now been
solved. All tactical nuclear weapons of the former
Soviet Union have been transferred to Russian
territory the transfer of sffategic nuclear weapons
is under way and Belarus and Kazakhstan havejoined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.
Ukraine had agreed to do the same and finally, on
16th November 1994, the parliament of Ukraine
ratified the NPT by a wide margin. Ukraine will,
however, only formally accede to the treaty as a
non-nuclear state once it has have received assu-
rances from the United States, the United King-
dom, France and Russia about its territorial inte-
gnty. The parliament had not been in a hurry to
ratify Ukraine's NPI accession, also because it
accused the United States of dragging its feet on
the implementation of a $ 350 million promise in
disarmament aid€. Meanwhile the transfer of
strategic nuclear weapons to Russian territory is
under way and those remaining on Ukraine terri-
tory cannot be targeted or fred without Russian
co-operation. Ukraine has also agreed to an audit
by the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) of all nuclear materials on its territory.
202. Two states, Iraq and North Korea, have
managed to establish a nuclear weapons develop-
ment programme despite IAEA monitoring, but
Iraq has been deprived of the programme while
2t
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North Korea has frozen its programme and on
21st October 1994 signed an agreement with the
United States to resffucture its nuclear progralnme.
203. A proposed world-wide ban on nuclear
tests is high on the agenda of the 1995 NPT
review conference, in particular because a very
large number of the non-nuclear weapon states
consider adherence to a test ban treaty by the
nuclear weapon states as a litmus test of their
good faith.
2M. Many NPT signatories are accusing nuclear
weapon states of failing to fulfil their side of the
non-proliferation bargain, which, under Article 6
of the NPT, commits them " in good faith " to
negotiate an end to the nuclear arms race and
eventual nuclear disarmament.
205. Altogether, it should be noted that the pros-
pects of indefinite NPT extension, as supported
by France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the
United States is not yet assured.
206. When establishing a common European
defence policy, European nations should therefore
take into account that, early in the next century,
some more states may have acquired weapons of
mass destruction. Proliferation of these weapons
remains one of the major challenges for inter-
national security and for European defence. There
may be not only a threat of such weapons to Euro-
pe's territory, but European armed forces opera-
ting overseas will also need new strategies and
protective capabilities in possible crises or
conflicts with adversaries who are in possession
of mass destruction weapons. A ballistic missile
defence capability of some kind will have to be
developed which not one single European country
will be able to afford. European and frans-atlantic
co-operation in this field is urgently required.
207. The initiative taken at NATO's summit
meeting in Brussels in January 1994 * that work
begin immediately in appropriate fora of the
alliance to develop an overall policy framework
to consider how to reinforce on-going prevention
efforts and how to reduce the proliferation threat
and protect against it " should therefore be wel-
comed.
208. An issue which is perhaps even more diffi-
cult to handle is the theft and smuggling of pluto-
nium and other nuclear materials, mostly from the
Soviet Union, to would-be proliferators else-
where. The German authorities have been particu-
larly active and successful in tracking down cases
of nuclear smuggling, not only because it is a
crossroad of trade routes but also because it has
acquired a thorough knowledge of Central and
Eastern European criminal activities through the
reunification process and the gradual withdrawal
of the former Soviet forces from the territory of
the former German Democratic Republic. The
number of cases of suspected nuclear smuggling
investigated in Germany has increased alarm-
ingly, from 4 in 1990 to 41 in 1991, 158 in 1992,
241in 1993 and 90 in the frst half of 1994.
209. Little is known about nuclear smuggling at
the southern border of Russia into Iran and other
Middle Eastern countries, but there is no reason to
feel comfortable about that. Not all nuclear smug-
gling is alarming to the same degree, sometimes it
is just a sniff of plutonium from a smoke detector.
Other cases, such as those reported in May and
August 1994, however, involve weapons-grade
plutonium 239.
2I0. Why is it suspected that these nuclear mate-
rials come from Russia? This country is now dis-
mantling almost 10 000 nuclear warheads, return-
ing the plutonium to store, where it is easier to
stealor. Moreover, it has a large quantity of highly
enriched uranium and civil reactor-grade pluto-
nium which also may be hazardous if handled by
malicious people. Without modern western bar-
coding and computerised stock systems, Russia
has great difficulty in accurately keeping track of
all its nuclear material.
2ll. Smuggled plutonium is more likely to
come fr<im nuclear stockpiles or research labora-
tories than from one of the three manufacturing
cenfies for weapons-grade plutonium. In this frame-
work, it should also be noted that Russian nuclear
scientists, who in the Soviet era were part of a
highly-privileged community, have suffered a
serious decline in status, income and motivation,
which, each in themselves, may easily lead to
compensatory activities.
212. The risks, caused by nuclear smuggling and
the brain-drain of nuclear scientists are almost too
obvious to be mentioned here. Some non-nuclear
weapon countries are interested in the establish-
ment of a nuclear weapons progftlrnme and wish
to acquire the knowledge and material to do so.
Others are already one stage ahead and may try to
improve existing prograrnmes. Nor can the possi-
bility of terrorist groups acquiring nuclear mate-
rial be excluded.
213. What has so far been done to curb the risks
involved? In order to counter the threat of a
nuclear scientists brain-drain from Russia, the
European Union, Japan, Russia and the United
States set up the International Science and Tech-
nology Centre in Moscow in March 1994, which
has now approved more than 50 research projects
and committed $ 30 million to sponsor 3 000
scientists over the next three years.
214. This is a good start but, knowing that these
3 000 scientists may represent only l07o of the
41. In the framework of recent nuclear disannament agree-
ments, the United States and Russia will each have to store at
least 50 tons of plutonium extracted from dismantled
warheads.
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Russian scientists who have knowledge that is
useful to anyone intent on building a nuclear
bomb, it seems to be just a drop in the ocean. The
$ 30 million committed is also ridiculously little
when compared to the $ 4.5 billion which an
international consortium is going to spend in
order to dismantle North Korea's nuclear pro-
gramme and replace it with new energy supplies
and safer light water reactors a2.
215. Since 1991, the United States Congress has
authorised $ 988 million to help diminish the
nuclear threat from the former Soviet Union. In
July 1994 only $ 58 million of this formidable
sum had been spent. An amount of $ 4.2 million
has been spent on improving export controls for
the accounting of nuclear materials, of which only
$ I million has been spent in Russiao3.
216. It is said that, to a large degree, the pro-
gramme was only very fragmentarily imple-
mented because of friction with Russian nuclear
experts, low funding and lack of attention from
the top level of the United States administration.
217. It should be noted here that while the Uni-
ted States is contemplating methods to make its
surplus of weapons-grade plutonium as unusable
as possible, most Russian experts consider such
behaviour as sacrilege. For many years, Russia
has spent a disproportionate part of its national
income on plutonium production and now thinks
that, in the next century, plutonium may become
an attractive fuel for nuclear energy plants.
218. Apparently, there is an urgent need for
more co-ordinated multilateral action in order to
produce the highest standards to control stocks of
nuclear material, in particular plutonium, and to
prevent theft and smuggling. Positive results can
be expected only if such action is the result of
careful negotiations among equal partners.
219. Moreover, agreements should be concluded
to provide mechanisms for the continuous and
swift sharing of intelligence on nuclear smug-
gling. In this respect, Germany has set an example
in its agreement with Russia on this subject. At an
informal meeting of Foreign Ministers from the
European Union on 7th-8th September, Germany
pressed for Europol, the European police agency,
to be given greater responsibility for fighting this
sort of crime. WEU could make an important
contribution to non-proliferation by creating a
nuclear non-proliferation research and monitoring
centre at WEU level, which could co-ordinate
European efforts in this field.
42. Ot the total amount of $ 4.5 billion, South Korea is
expected to provide 55Vo, the rest being split among the five
United Nations Security Council members and Australia,
Canada, Germany and Japan.
43. International Herald Tribune, 29th August 1994.
220. The large plutonium stocks resulting from
the bilateral nuclear disarmament agreements
between Russia and the United States make it
imperative for them to meet their specific respon-
sibilities. The possibilities include proposals to
put their surplus plutonium into internationally
controlled safe storage, where it could be properly
monitored; also, both countries could agree on the
stocks to be degraded and offer a more open audit
of their total plutonium stocks.
VIII. The rdle of WEU
(a) Recent operalinns 
-
outside and inside theframework of WEU
22I. In recent years, WEU has taken responsi-
bility for several operations which have been, or
are still being, conducted successfully. Mention is
made here of the mine-clearing operation in the
Persian Gulf. Currently, the WEU mission on the
Danube and the Operation Sharp Guard in the
Adriatic, both monitoring the sanctions against
the different republics of the former Yugoslavia,
are still continuing. Earlier Assembly reports have
discussed these missions in detail.
222, The following paragraphs will review miss-
ed oppornrnities in Rwanda and WEU's activities
in Mostar. Sadly enough, on both occasions and for
different reasons, WEU did less well than could
have been expected if its member states, represen-
ted in the Council, had shown greater promptness
of action and political will to act together.
(i) Rwanda
223. Events in Rwanda have again clearly
shown the futility of the nearly endless discus-
sions on peace-keeping and humanitarian action
in recent years. On 6th April 1994, the death of
President Juv6nal Habyarimana appeared to be
the signal leading to a genocide in which more
than 500 000 people were killed while many more
fled their homes and country. A large number of
the refugees died from cholera and dysentery.
From 9th to 14th April, both Belgium and France
deployed troops to evacuate their nationals. On
22nd Apnl 1994, the United Nations reduced its
United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda
(I-INAMIR) from2 500 to 270 members.
224. On 17th May, the United Nations Security
Council agreed in principle to expand IJNAMIR
to 5 500 troops in order to protect civilians under
attack in special humanitarian zones and help
guard international relief convoys. Implementa-
tion of this decision proved difficult because eight
of the nine African countries which had voluntee-
red troops had stipulated conditions, such as the
supply of arms and equipment, which took time to
be met.
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225. Meanwhile France took the initiative of
sending troops to Rwanda in the framework of a
humanitarian action. At the request of France and
Italy, the Permanent Council of WEU held an
extraordinary meeting on 17th June to discuss the
situation in Rwanda.
226. The Permanent Council instructed the
Planning Cell to act as a point of contact and
co-ordination between the member countries
contributing to the action and the headquarters
commanding the operation.
227. Later, a member of the WEU Planning Cell
was incorporated in the Cenfte op6rationnel inter-
armdes (COIA) at the French Ministry of Defence
to co-ordinate the support in material and troops
that was provided by other WEU member states.
This was the first time that the WEU Planning Cell
participated operationally in a force deploymenta.
228. On 21st June, the Permanent Council again
met in the configuration of fifteen countries.
229. It appears that the Permanent Council ried
not to oppose the French initiative of sending
troops while at the same time Erying to become
involved as little as possible. The communiqu6
issued after the meeting on 21st June stated that a
number of member states had confirmed that they
were prepared to contribute to the initiative to ease
the tenible suffering in Rwanda, provided the Uni-
ted Nations Security Council reached a new deci-
sion and due account being taken of the time
needed to build up the means necessary for the
effective deployment of an enlarged UNAMIR.
230. It was decided, however, that the support
provided by member states would not be announced
in the framework of WEU, but directly by the
capitals concerned.
231. At a later strge, logistical and humanitarian
support was indeed provided by Belgium, Ger-
many, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and
the United Kingdom.
232. One really wonders why, with eight of the
nine full member states providing some form of
tangible support in material and human resources,
and the involvement of the Planning Cell, the
Council took so many pains to ensure that it was
not called a WEU operation.
233. It should be noted that France, when it took
the initiative of sending troops, had taken into
account all the lessons that had been learnt from
recent humanitarian operations. It would not act
without a United Nations Security Council man-
date, only in a multinational operation, Article VII
of the Charter was to be applied in order not to be
dependent on the parties involved in the conflict,
and both the length and the objective of the opera-
tion were to be determined in advance.
234. With the approval of the United Nations
Security Council, France, on23rdJune then laun-
ched Operation Turquoise, deploying 2 500
troops in two bases in Zaie, Goma and Bukavu.
Of these, some I 000 troops would cross the fron-
tier with Rwanda to provide humanitarian aid. As
regards the objective, the French government had
clearly stated that it had no intention of fighting
anyone nor of becoming involved in internal poli-
tical problems. Contact was being maintained
with the RPF (Rwanda Patriotic Front) to ensure
that France's action was seen as purely humanita-
rian. It wished to help and encourage non-govern-
mental organisations by protecting human lives.
French soldiers had strict instructions to avoid any
contact with areas of hostilities and not to take
issue with the RPF.
235. Why, in the face of a major humanitarian
disaster, was there so much reluctance in Europe
to act? Indeed, it has been said that not all the
reasons for this passivity are shameful, one of
them being that civil war in Rwanda was not a
threat to stability in the region or in Africa as a
whole. On the other hand, it was quite surprising
that the United Nations had withdrawn its troops
just when they could have at least done something
to reduce the killing and make less difficult the
creation of a new civil order.
236. In fact, Rwanda was an excellent instance
of the theory and logic of the common European
foreign and security policy being put to the test.
Joint European action would have been in accor-
dance with WEU's Petersberg declaration. It
would have spread the cost and risks of a humani-
tarian or military intervention and it would have
reduced suspicion of individual actors having
potential national agendas, providing a balance
between the more interested and the less interested
countries. Instead of deciding to act together,
most of the WEU member states used the Council
meeting on Rwanda to stammer excuses while
incriminating others of trying to act with the
wrong motives or in self-interest.
237. lndeed, in Rwanda " something " has been
done, but it could have been done better if WEU
had been better prepared for the type of operation
that after some years of experience with the'o new
world order o' could be anticipated. The Planning
Cell could have done more if it had not been
trapped in the vicious circle where the Council
does not provide more resources in the belief that
the Planning Cell is not operational.
238. The situation in Rwanda would also have
offered an excellent opportunity to involve the asse
ciate parmers in a WEU operation. The full possibi-
lities of this new statute, as defined in the Kirchberg
declaration of May 1994, should be implemented.
If there is no compelling reason to leave them on the
side lines, they should be involved and participate
in meetings of the Permanent Council.44. Le Monde, 30th June and lst July 1994.
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239. Rwanda is not a unique case. Africa is boil-
ing, and one needs barely mention Burundi,
Somalia, Liberia and Angola to realise that the
political situation is still far from stable. If the
WEU Council considers the preparation of
contingency plans to be a serious matter and not
merely a pretext for keeping its Planning Cell
busy, Africa is a point in case. WEU should
create a European humanitarian action force
which could function as a fire brigade in case of
urgency.
240. At the same time, because the United
Nations Security Council correctly tries, in the
frst place, to rely on regional forces, WEU should
help in establishing an African action force com-
posed of troop contingents from different African
nations, trained and equipped by WEU member
states.
(ii) WEU's activities in Mostar
241. In the presidency report on Mostar of
5th May 1994, it is mentioned that at the request
of the Council of the European Union, prelimi-
nary work on a possible WEU contribution was
carried out in 1993.
242. The options presented ranged from merely
supervising a specific agreement among the
parties on the policing of Mostar to the possibility
of WEU establishing a police force proper,
carrying out its duties directly on the spot.
243. Later, WEU focused on the possibility of
a contribution to the supervision of the local
police forces, their future organisation as a
single, unified force and some of the ways in
which WEU could contribute to the discharge of
police duties.
244. WEU has taken part in a preparatory mis-
sion decided on by the European Union and it is
pointed out that under the auspices of the prepa-
ratory mission and with WEU participation, the
local police chiefs have held their fust joint meet-
ing for over a year.
245. On 12th October, the European Union
Administrator of Mostar, Hans Koschnick, stated
that the support of WEU " until then had not been
very encouraging ". He asked WEU to lose no
time in sending the police force it had promised.
WEU had promised to send 180 police officers to
Mostar of which only 100 were in place by the
end of October 1994, including some 40 French
and German. At that time, one quarter had not yet
been committed by member states. At present, the
Muslim and Croat parts of the city each have their
own police force. The intention now is to provide
the local police with the opportunity to work
together in order to guarantee security throughout
the city.
246. Considering the rather limited activities of
WEU, one might well wonder why it takes so
much time to send a small police force of 180.
Again, this is an operation which fits perfectly
into WEU missions as formulated in the Peters-
berg declaration. The theoretical framework
exists, but apparently the political will among the
changing coalitions of member states to imple-
ment a policy to which everybody has agreed is
still lacking. The reluctance to act, which is parti-
cularly manifest in the time-consuming beating
around the bush and procedural battles in the
Council, is tarnishing the image of the organisa-
tion. This is especially exasperating when it
concerns limited operations such as Mostar where
swift action would be possible with a coalition of
the willing.
247. As the Dutch Defence Minister, Joris
Voorhoeve, rightly said: " In Mostar WEU's
credibility is at stake. It should not fail this test. "
(b) Reinforcing the operalional organs of WEU
(i) The WEU Satellite Centre at Torrej6n
248. The establishment of the WEU Satellite
Centre in Torrej6n, which started its three-year
experimental phase in April 1993, has been an
important step forward. It is a f,irst concrete proof
of the Council's recognition that satellite observa-
tion is a vital element of a European security and
defence identity. Many issues regarding the
Centre are discussed in the report of the Techno-
logical and Aerospace Committee " The future of
the WEU Satellite Cenffe in Torrej6n ", submitted
by Mr. Lopez Henares, Rapporteuras.
249. Notwithstanding the remarkable progress
achieved by the Satellite Centre, which has beenjustly welcomed in the abovementioned report, it
is thought here that some additional comments
should be made in the light of the development of
a European defence policy. With increasing Euro-
pean security and defence responsibilities and the
changing attitudes of the transatlantic partners
over their r6le in Europe, it is steadily becoming
more evident that initial ideas regarding the r6le
and functioning of the Satellite Centre in its expe-
rimental phase were too limited in regard to the
tasks and objectives of the Centre. At present,
some of these limitations prevent the Centre from
developing a more operational r6le. When taking
decisions in spring 1995 to ensure the continuity
of the Cenfte's work, the Council should take the
opportunity of redefining the r6les and responsi-
bilities of the Satellite Centre in order to give it a
far more active and operational r6le. The frst is
that the equipment and premises should be adap-
ted in such a way as to be able to put into effect
25
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the memorandum of understanding concerning
the interpretation and use of Helios I images. It is
well known that this can be done without funda-
mental changes in the Centre's equipment
and without involving disproportionate financial
commitments.
250. The second is that a working relationship
should be established between the Centre and the
WEU Planning Cell in Brussels. From the very
start it was thought that the Centre could become
more operational by using data from the Helios
sateltte. It should also be recalled that the terms
of reference of the Planning Cell include its task,
in times of crisis, to provide advice to the WEU
authorities on the practicability and nature of any
WEU involvement.
251. It would be only logical to establish such
links between Satellite Centre and Planning Cell
as to enable both organs to acquire the necessary
experience in their support tasks for crisis-mana-
gement. An organisation which claims to play an
important r6le in the Ewopean security and defence
identity can be effective only if its various parts
are able to co-operate on a practical level so that
the options for a decision may be presented to
those responsible in the event of emergency.
(ii) The Planning Cell
252. At its June 1994 session, the WEU Assem-
bly discussed a report on the WEU Planning
Cell6 and adopted recommendation 561 on that
subject. The Council has given its reply to this
recommendation on 2nd November t994*.
253. Since then, the situation has not changed
basically. It is useless to repeat the conclusions of
the Defence Committee's earlier report which are
still valid. The main problem is clearly that the
Planning Cell does not get enough political sup-
port to do its work properly. A year and a half
after its establishment, the Planning Cell is
expected to present a full list of forces answerable
to WEU. The development of an inventory of
force packages which should enable WEU to
carry out the tasks conferred on it has only just
started.
254. Once again, it is not the Planning Cell itself
that should be blamed for this, but rather the
member states of WEU which, through their shuf-
fling, reluctance, and hesitant, slow actions, are
blocking any real progress.
255. With contingency plans and force packages
available, it should have been a matter of days to
send a humanitarian mission to Rwanda. At pre-
46. The WEU Planning Cell, report submitted on behalf of
the Defence Committee by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, Rap-
porteur, Document 1421.
47. Assembly document A/WEU/DG (94)23.
sent, even a very limited operation such as send-
ing a modest police force to Mostar takes many
months to materialise.
256. If the Planning Cell is meant to be a useful
organ which would contribute to the operational
capabilities of WEU, the Council should provide
it with the appropriate equipment and staff to
develop it into a real headquarters for the co-ordi-
nation of European operations.
257. According to the document on a status of
association for the nine Central European states,
published as part of the Luxembourg declaration
of 9th May 1994, the associate partners may
have a liaison arrangement with the Planning
Cell. At present, this means no more than that
each of these states can ask the Planning Cell
to be informed about specific activities of the
Cell, or that the Planning Cell can take the initia-
tive to inform them of such activities as deemed
appropriate.
258. According to the abovementioned docu-
ment, associate partners may associate them-
selves with decisions taken by member states
concerning humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-
keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis-
management, including peace-making.
259. The document further states that associate
partners " will be able to participate in their
implementation as well as in relevant exercises
and planning unless a majority of the member
states, or half of the member states including the
Presidency, decide otherwise. They will be invited
to provide information on forces. They will also
be able to offer forces for specific operations.
When it is agreed that they join such WEU opera-
tions by committing forces, they will have the
same obligations as other participants, as well as
the right of involvement in the command struc-
tures and in the Council's subsequent decision-
making process. The precise modalities of their
participation, including their rights and obliga-
tions, in each such WEU operation will be agreed
on a case-by-case basis ".
260. Given the fact that an open invitation has
been extended to associate partners to participate
in WEU's main operational tasks, it would seem
appropriate for the Planning Cell to prepare a list
of the forces associate partners might make avai-
lable to WEU and to include such forces in the
force packages which are being prepared for
contingency plans.
261. It is also noted here that the scope of asso-
ciate partnership as defined in the Kirchberg
document would justify a closer permanent link
with the Planning Cell than the present liaison
iurangement which seems unsatisfactory for part-
ners who might wish to make full use of the
opportunities thus offered.
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IX. Defence spending in Earope
262. If Western European states are serious in
their assertion that there may be situations where
they will have to act on their own, without the par-
ticipation of their transatlantic allies, they will
have to stop cutting their defence budgets, mainly
because they currently have so little useable
defence capability.
263. One may well wonderhow the WEU mem-
ber states will ever manage to develop the famous
European defence identity if there continues to be
such a wide and even increasing gap between
their words and deeds. To a certain degree, it may
be understandable that the share of defence
expenditures in the GDP has decreased in recent
years as shown hereafter:
of the burden or the increased responsibilities to
which the WEU member states lay claim.
266. It should be recalled that the United Srates,
with 250 million people, wishes to maintain a
capability to conduct simultaneously and success-
fully two regional wars, while the European
Union states, with more than32O million people,
cannot even conduct one without significant out-
side help.
267. In an interview, General George Joulwan,
NATO's SACEUR has expressed concern about
the recent drop in force levels among NATO
member states$. Most nations are falling short of
their commitments to the multinational force
structure of Allied Command Europe and the
rapid reaction forces. General Joulwan confirmed
that the Europeans are relying too heavily on the
United States to fulfil their needs in the areas of
communications and airlift.
268. Now that the cold war has made way for a
far less stable and secure world than initially
expected, it is time to stop taking peace dividends.
Too many European nations still think they can
afford to use their defence budget as a money-
spinner to solve all other budgetary problems.
269. In fact this is rather the moment to mark
time and reconsider defence spending from a
different angle, taking into account a far less pro-
Gross domestir product and defence expenditure
annual varialion (Vo) in NATO countrics*
(based on constant prices)
From 1992 Belgian defence expenditure reflects the decision by the Belgian Govemment to demilitarise the Gendarmerie.
264. This is a general trend, occurring in almost
all NAIO and former Warsaw Pact countries,
which can be ascribed to the remarkable change in
international relations.
265. It is completely incomprehensible, how-
ever, that the member states of WEU which
accounted for 36Vo of the Atlantic Alliance's
defence expenditures in 1983, only accounted for
28Vo in l993oe. This is a far cry from the fair share
48. Source: NAIO review, April 1994.
49. Report by Mr. Jacques Genton, Senator, on behalf of the
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces Committee on
the military prograrnme bill for 1995-2000, page 67. (Second
ordinary session, 1993-1994, No. 489).
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mising security situation. Knowing that there will
be circumstances where it can no longer rely on
its transatlantic partners to intervene, Europe will
have to make its own specific threat-risk analysis
and evaluate its own security environment in the
frameworkof WEU.
270. In the following paragraphso mention is
made of recent developments in some WEU
member states.
(a) Germany
27t. A white paper on the security of the Ger-
man Federal Republic and on the situation and the
future of the Bundeswehr, published on 5th April
1994, has advocated a complete reorganisation of
the armed forces. The white paper proposes the
establishment of a core of crisis-reaction forces,
integration into multinational structures and a
two-tier conscript army.
272. The crisis-reaction forces will be assigned
primarily to international missions in multinatio-
nal formations within the framework of NATO or
WEU or under the auspices of the United Nations
or the CSCE. They will, however, also be avail-
able for ensuring territorial defence under plans
for the fuII mobilisation of main defence forces.
These crisis-reaction forces will comprise about
one fourth of the gtound forces, one third of the
airforce and about 40Vo of the navy, and will enjoy
equipment and funding priority. As regards equip-
ment, priority will be given to enhancing C3I and
transport capacities.
273. The German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, has
announced that Germany's armed forces budget
will be increased slightly and will remain un-
touched over the next four years. While in 1994
the defence budget stood at DM 47.5 billion, it
would be increased to DM 47.9 bilhon plus infla-
tion over the next four years. The lenglh of mili-
tary service will be shortened from 12 to l0
months and the size of the Bundeswehr will be
reduced to 338 000 men and women by the begin-
ning of 1996. Both these decisions.willproduce
savings, as a consequence of which it will be pos-
sible to we 307o of the defence budget for new
investments instead of the present22%ost.
274. Germany is also planning to build an all-
pu4rose ship to be used as a troop fransporter and
floating headquarters. It is designed to show that
Gerrnany is taking its new international responsi-
bilities seriously.
275. With the anny structure 5 reorganisation
almost completed, the German ilrmy now com-
prises eight divisions, one air mobile command
and24 brigades. According to the German Chief
of Defence Staff, General Klaus Naumann, the
German confiibution to the NATO rapid reaction
forces will be as follows: the army is to provide
five fully ready brigades plus the German compo-
nent to the Franco-German brigade to NAIO's
allied rapid reaction corps, the multinational air-
mobile division and the Allied Command Europe
mobile force as well as the Eurocorps.
276. The Luftwaffe is to provide six squadrons
for attack, air defence and reconnaissance, two
mixed SAM wings and two to three mixed trans-
port wings. The navy will make available two to
three task force gtoups.
277. For deployment outside the NAIO area, the
army has been directed to earmark up to one divi-
sion, while the Luftwaffe is expected to prepare
all fransport assets as well as a number of combat
aircraft to be specified at the time.
(b) Italy
278. In August 1994, the new Italian Govern-
ment endorsed the proposals of the Defence
Minister, Cesare Previti, to restructure the armed
forces. The length of military service will gra-
dually be shortened from the present twelve
months to six months in 1999. The total strength
of the armed forces will be reduced from 330 000
to25O 000. There will be an increased reliance on
specialised volunteers.
279. The main objective of the present restruc-
turing proposals is the creation of specialised
units which could be deployed at the request of
the United Nations or WEU. Italy is planning to
create a rapid reaction force together with Spain
and France, to be based in Tuscany.
280. Around 80 billion lire in the next ten years
have been earmarked for modernisation, in parti-
cular for new equipment. The share of defence
spending in Italy's GNP would increase from the
present l.6%o to 27o.
(c) United Kngdam
28I. The United Kingdom has drastically redu-
ced its defence budget in recent years. A Novem-
ber 1993 review of public spending cut defence
spending by almost f900 million over the next
three years, following a budget cut of more thanfl billion announced in 1992. The budget alloca-
tion for 1994-95 (923.49 billion) and the provi-
sion for 1995-96 represent cuts of 3.5Vo and 6.8c/o
respectively in real terms.
282. The United Kingdom's regular armed
forces numbered 254488 on lst April 1994, a
reduction of more than 1Vo from 1993 and l77o
from the " Options for change " defence reduc-
tions baseline of lst April 1990. Under present
plans, the army strength will be 119 000 person-
nel and40 battalions by 1997.51. Financial Times, 29th August 1994.
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283. Tlvo divisions, 3 (UK) Division and 1 (UK
Armoured Division) are assigned to NATO's
Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps
(ARRC). Moreover,24 Airmobile Brigade is assi-
gned to the ARRC's Airmobile Multinational
Division (Central).
(d) France
284. The French government has proposed a
defence budget of F202253 for 1995, represen-
ting a l.5%o increase as compared with the 1994
budget. According to the government's white
paper, presented in March 1994,the French army
should have a stand-by force of 120 000 to
130 000 ftoops that could be quickly projected to
a distant theatre.
285. The military programme law 1995-2000
adopted in spring 1994, pledges to raise defence
spending by O.57o annually until the end of the
decade. However, since it takes neither future
inflation nor economic gtowth into account, mili-
tary spending will in fact decline from 3.3Vo of
gross domestic product in 1994 to 2.9Vo in the
year 2000.
286. The programme law calls for an army of
227 O0O men with eight divisions by the year
2000. The total of armed forces personnel will
drop from 609 000 in 1994 to 579 000 in 2001.
On the basis of the military programme law and
the white paper mentioned earlier, the French
army is now planning a new internal structure of
general staffto be approved by the govemment in
early 1995. The basic principle is that the army
should be able to project abroad a force of40 000
troops. In fact, this force will have to be rotated,
which means that 120 000 should be available for
this task, reinforced by support and logistic units.
This objective may be a tall order, when one
recalls how much trouble it took to send 17 000
troops to the Gulf in the framework of Operation
Daguet. Recently when 2 500 troops, 700 vehicles
and 9 000 tons of freight had to be ffansported to
Zaire-Rwanda for Operation Tirrquoise, logistics
was a problem, and Russian transport aircraft had
to be chartered to do par-t of the job.
(e) The Netherlands
287. In the Netherlands, the coalition partners in
the new govemment have concluded an agreement
to economise 2.4 billion guilders in the defence
expeditures for the 1995-98 period. It was agreed
that these reductions should not affect the imple-
mentation of the 1993 Defence priorities review,
which, if fully implemented would bring about a
reduction of 44%o of the total armed forces person-
nel in 1998 as compared with the situation in 1990.
The government has now made proposals for
implementing the budget cuts, which will be dis-
cussed in parliament at the beginning of next year.
X. European anned forces co-operation
288. On 13th September 1994, France and the
United Kingdom concluded an agreement to
twin the French Rapid Action Force, (FAR,
45 000 troops) and the British Field Army
(57 000 troops), both qualified to be developed
for action in theatres abroad. The agreement
envisages exchanges of instruction, joint trai-
ning and participation in joint manoeuvres. A
first practice is planned to take place in 1995,
when high ranking officers will participate in
simulated manceuvres in order to discuss mili-
tary doctrines and tactics.
289. More co-operation between French and
British armed forces is being prepared. A Franco-
British summit in Chartres on 18th November
1994 will be devoted largely to defence and
security issues. Both countries are now planning
to establish closer co-operation in military avia-
tion which would make it easier for their air-
forces to co-operate in humanitarian and peace-
keeping operations overseas under the aegis of
the United Nations. Such operations, it is said,
could take place in the framework of NAIO or
WEU.
290. The Anglo-French Joint Commission on
Nuclear Policy and Doctrines2 is continuing its
work and will present a report at the Anglo-French
summit meeting.
291. The airforces of Belgium, Germany, the
Netherlands and Norway have recently concluded
agreements making air transport assets available
to each other in order to improve airlift capability
and reduce costs.
292. The agreements cover the whole spectrum
of possible military operations, including peace-
keeping and rescue operations.
293. The Defence Ministers of Germany and the
Netherlands have signed an agreement to create a
German-Netherlands anny corps which will be
operational at the beginning of 1995. The army
corps will consist of 40 000 to 50 000 men,
15 000 being provided by the Netherlands. Mixed
units will be stationed in both Germany and the
Netherlands and the headquarters of the corps is
to be located in Miinster.
294. On 7th September 1992, a Franco-Spanish-
Italian proposal was launched to constitute an
aero-maritime force capable of fulfilling missions
under the auspices of WEU. The guiding principle
for this proposal was a desire to co-ordinate aero-
maritime forces so that a maximum number of
assets between the three countries were available
52. The work of this committee has been discussed in the
report on the r6le and future of nuclear weapons submitted on
behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr. De Decker, Rappor-
teur, Document 1420.
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at alay one time. Having been placed on the table
of WEU, the proposal led in part to Combined
Endeavour, a WEU maritime operation plan for
the use of maritime forces answerable to WEU.
295. In fact, the Combined Endeavour solution
elaborated by WEU with the help of the Planning
Cell did not meet the expectations of the three ini-
tiators. Pursuing the earlier initiative, Italy has
suggested a ground element to complement the air
and naval components. The French Defence
Minister, Frangois L6otard, speaking in March
1994, linked the earlier proposal with a sugges-
tion to create " European intervention forces,
commanded by a European General Staff and
which would be both multinational and have inte-
grated (air, land and sea) forces ". At WEU's col-
loquy on lTth October 1994, Mr. L6otard insisted
on the achievement around the European corps of
a network or reserve of variable-geometry air, sea
and land multinational forces with flexibility
allowing the governments of member states to
respond in an appropriate manner to the require-
ments of a given crisis.
296. No further details have been provided
about the creation of the common intervention
force planned by France, Italy and Spain, which
could be particularly useful for operations in the
Mediterranean. Recently, the Spanish Defence
Minister declared that there are no problems with
the naval component for this force, but that there
are still problems to be solved with the army com-
ponent. It is hoped that some of the remaining
obstacles can be overcome in the framework of
the trilateral manoeuwe Tramontana which is to
take place in Spain, in November 1994'3.
297. In June 1994, Poland established a rapid
reaction force, the 25th Air Cavalry Division,
which is on five hours' notice to be deployed
anywhere within Polish territory. The division
will consist of three independent regiments, com-
bining paratroop elements and 150 helicopters
when at full sfrength. The principal helicopter, the
PZL W3Wwill be completely modified with wes-
tern avionics and a new air-to-surface missile and
chin-mounted canon.
298. The Netherlands and Poland have signed a
naval co-operation agreement which, it is hoped,
will lead to increased interoperability between
Polish naval forces and those of NATO. The main
objectives of the agreement are:
- 
exchange of information and experience;
- 
participation in training and joint naval
exerclses;
- 
joint training of mine countermeasures
and search and rescue units in the Baltic;
- 
maintaining regular working contacts
between the Hydrographic Office of the
Polish Navy and that of the Royal
Netherlands Nary.
299. Many similar agreements have been or are
being concluded between WEU member states and
associate parhers with the aim of making the armed
forces of partner states familiar with practices and
procedures in Westem European armed forces and
preparing possible future joint operations.
300. On 28th Jwe 1994, the Defence Ministers
of Belgium and the Netherlands signed an agree-
ment on the reinforcement of co-operation
between their naval forces. The agreement envi-
sages the creation of a bilateral operational head-
quarters in 1995 to manage the surface ships of
both navies. Both Ministers have asked their air-
force chiefs to study co-operation possibilities
between the airforces.
XI. European e quipment c o-operatian
301. Europe must get its act together to impro-
ve co-operation in procurement and arms produc-
tion. The protracted policy of fiddling and make-
shift measures which has been characteristic in
past decades, with varying success and many
failures, should now be renounced. With decrea-
sing defence budgets on the one hand and new
equipment requirements on the other, European
nations which state that they wish firmly to esta-
blish a European security and defence identity
can no longer afford merely to dabble with
equipment co-operation.
302. The importance of and need for European
armaments co-operation has been recognised by
the WEU member states in many official declara-
tions, to name only the 1984 Rome declaration on
WEU's revitalisation and the 1987 The Hague
platform on European security interests. In the
declaration by member states of WEU, which are
also members of the European Union, on the r6le
of Western European Union and its relations with
the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance
which is attached to the ffeaty on European Union,
it is stated that enhanced co-operation in the field
of armaments will be examined further " with the
aim of creating a European amaments agency ".
303. In December 1992, the defence ministers of
the thirteen countries united in the lndependent
European Programme Group (IEPG) decided to
transfer IEPG's functions to WEU.
304. Since then, IEPG has been transformed into
WEAG, the Western European Armaments
Group, based in Brussels within the framework of
WEU. However, many problems still have to be
solved to make it an effective organisation and it
is said that the creation of a European armaments53. L,e Monde, lst October 1994.
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agency, now actively under study, will take many
more years if not decades 5a.
305. The time has come for Western European
governments to think collectively and urgently
about the dimensions of the defence industrial
capabilities and the technological expertise they
wish to maintain in Europe, the techniques they
could use to maintain these capabilities and the
costs they are willing to incur. Action should be
taken urgently.
306. Should Western European states become
involved in a conflict in the futrure, they should be
able to rely on the appropriate industrial support.
307. Even when defence spending is low, desired
basic capabilities have to be maintained on the
assumption that the international political situa-
tion may deteriorate in the longer term and the
need for defence increase once again.
308. Despite occasional co-operative program-
mes, the European defence industry is still stron-
gly divided and the size of different national
companies is not great enough to face strong com-
petition in international defence markets. Ratio-
nalisation in the United States' defence industry
began earlier than predicted with the taking over
of Grumman by Northrop, Lockheed buying
General Dynamic's F-16 fighter plant and the
recently announced merger between Lockheed
and Martin Marietta Corporation as the most
spectacular events. This may not be the end of the
process. A comparative table of turnover in defence
business of the largest United States and Euro-pean companies is revealing.
Tfurnover in defence business 7993ss
($ billian)
10.06
9.40
7.55
6.95
6.06
6.05
5.00 (estimate)
4.79
4.2r
3.40
3.30
309. The continuing consolidation of the United
States' defence industry presents European manu-
facturers with a powerful challenge and they will
have to be tough and aggressive about doing the
same.
54. The subject of a European arrnaments agency has been
discussed in a recent Assembly document: The European
armaments agency 
- 
reply to the thfuty-ninth annual 1sp.n.1
the Council, report submitted on behalf of the Technological
and Aerospace Committee by Mr. Borderas, Rapporteur.
55. Source: Lehman Brothers.
310. European governments should not hamper
the transnational consolidation of their defence
industries. Political and legal barriers must be
cleared. WEAG may have been a laudable initia-
tive but, since its establishment almost two years
ago, little progress has been made apart from the
usual political declarations.
3ll. Arms co-operation can help bring down
procurement costs, but in co-operative projects,
the principle of fair return in individual pro-
grammes may have to be given up, being applied
rather to a range of collaborative programmes.
Squabbles in coming months and years over
national workshares in vital co-operation pro-
grarnmes such as the future large aircraft, the only
just-revived NH-90 helicopter and the Eurofighter
2000 will merely increase the cost of such equip-
ment and will make Europe's defence industry
resemble a three-ring circus rather than the lean
and mean industrial base which is needed.
312. If European states are serious in their ambi-
tion to rationalise procurement on a European
level, they may have to reduce the degree of natio-
nal preference which they exercise at present in
awarding contracts.
313. Implementing the decision taken at the
Franco-German summit meeting at Mulhouse in
May 1994, both countries are now settling the
establishment, legal statute, working methods and
internal organisation of the structure which will
have to link them in armaments matters. Before
the end of 1995, this will lead to the creation of a
Franco-German armaments agency, which should
manage co-operative procurement programmes
such as the Tiger attack helicopter, the VBM
light-armoured vehicle, the future large aircraft
and possibly the Helios [I reconnaissance satellite.
314. This Franco-German armaments agency
could be the nucleus of a future European agency
which still seems many years away.
XII. The needfor more air-ffi capability
315. Earlier Assembly reports have already
emphasised the need for more air-lift capability in
WEU member states if they want to enable WEU
to intervene independently. The Gulf war and all
recent humanitarian and peace-keeping opera-
tions have clearly demonstrated the serious short-
falt in air-lift which has forced European nations
to rely on the United States' afu-lift capacity or to
charter such means on the civilian market, often
using Russian large transport aircraft.
316. Indeed, NATO has taken decisions which
would make certain collective assets available to
WEU if needed, but a distinction should be drawn
between the collective assets of NATO and the
national assets of member states of the alliance, in
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particular the powerful resources of the United
States. It should also be noted that there may be
circumstances where, for a number of purely
practical reasons, the United States will not be
able to meet requests from its European allies.
317. The United States airforce's Air Mobility
Command (AMC) has now limited its24I C-l4I
Starlifters to 900 hours flying time per year in
order to prevent these aircraft from reaching their
expected lifetime prematurely. Morever, the C-
141 cannot accommodate many of the newer
types of equipment.
318. The C-5 Galaxy fleet has an average relia-
bility of under 75Vo but the 20 C-5s recently
deployed in Europe, inter alia for support opera-
tions in Rwanda, had maintenance problems
which kept 35-40Vo of them out of commission
for the frst two or three weeks.
319. The new C-17 programme, with an origi-
nally planned procurement of 120 aircraft, may be
capped at 40 aircraft56.
320. According to the Pentagon's 1993 bottom-
up review, the United States armed forces should
be able to fight two near-simultaneous major
regional conflicts by l999,but planned reductions
in the defence budget are thought to create an
important gap between air-lift requirements and
capacity available by the end of this centur5r 57.
321. European countries cannot afford to wait
until it comes to the worst. They will have to take
decisions in the near future if they want to have
sufficient air-lift capacity to meet contingencies in
the first decade of the next century.
322. A consortium of European aircraft manu-
facturersss is now developing a tactical transport
aircraft, the future large aircraft (FLA), which is
intended to replace existing fleets from 2002. This
consortium has now decided to charge a military
equipment subsidiary of Airbus with the develop-
ment and production of the FLA, a positive sign in
view of Airbus's good recent record in developing
and marketing aircraft in a relatively short time.
The intention is to provide customers with a fixed
price, fixed specification prograrnme to reduce
the risk of cost over-runs. The consortium esti-
mates that over the next 2O years there may be a
market for 350 FLA in Europe alone.
323. As usual, up until now in European co-ope-
rative equipment prograrnmes, the sharing of
work in any FLA production depends on the
financial commitrnents of the companies involved
56. Jane's Defence Weekly, l0th September 1994.
57. Jane's Defence Weekly, 2lstMay L994.
58. The consortium consists of A6rospatiale (France), Ale-
nia (Italy), British Aerospace (United Kingdom), CASA
(Spain) and Deutsche Aerospace Airbus (Germany) with
FLABEL (Belgium), OGMA (Portugal) and T[sas Clurkey)
as associated partners.
and their respective governments, and the number
of aircraft required by each specific country.
324. The feasibility study now being conducted
in which France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain
and Turkey are participating, with Belgium and
the United Kingdom as observers, will be com-
pleted at the beginning of 1995. This should be
followed by the pre-development phase, culmina-
ting in the formal launch of the programme in
mid-I997 through firm orders. First deliveries
could then be made at the end of theyear 2002.
325. The FLA, which would be able to meet the
requirements of practically every WEU member
state, would be an excellent method to unite these
countries in research, development and procure-
ment and could be insffumental in bringing together
European aircraft manufacturers to meet the chal-
lenge of the United States' defence indusfiry.
XIII. The estublishment of an independent
European satellile sy stem
326. As is known, the WEU Council has asked
the Space Group to prepare, for its spring 1995
meeting, a proposal for decision to set up an inde-
pendent European satellite system. This proposal
should also include a draft memorandum of
understanding containing the detailed specifica-
tions to be concluded between the present WEU
member states.
327. The industrial studies which were conduc-
ted under the supervision of the (so-called) Study
Management Team, chaired by Mr. Leonardo
Gagliardi, have concentrated on the technical
aspects of satellite system concepts providing
optical, infra-red and radar imaging capabilities.
Comparisons have been made between satellite
system concepts and programme steps with
respect to capabilities, cost, development times-
cales and risks. There can be little doubt that these
studies offer a sound basis for the Space Group to
prepare a proposal for decision by the Council.
328. An important question still to be addressed,
however, is which organisation will be respon-
sible for managing the establishment of an inde-
pendent European satellite system. This, in itself,
is a complicated task, requiring specialised know-
ledge. The limited size and human resources of
the Secretariat General of WEU in its present state
would certainly not be able to accomplish this
task.
329. Another question, closely related to the
creation of a satellite system and to be addressed
urgently, is the establishment of a proper cornmon
European intelligence potcy, which is a vital pre-
requisite for a European security and defence
policy. It would be unwise to leave this question
open, because of the many problems which it may
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indeed evoke, one of them being the need for a
European electronic intelligence satellite.
330. The sudden and short-lived crisis in early
October last when Iraq began a massive deploy-
ment of armed forces near its border with Kuwait,
is the most recent illustration of the apparent
shortcomings in this field. At that time, the United
States raised the alarm and responded by imme-
diately sending tens of thousands of troops and
supplementary equipment. In the absence of
proper intelligence-gathering equipment such as
sufficiently high performance earth observation
satellites, European countries had no choice other
than to believe what the United States told them,
using among other things a selection of their own
satellite images.
331. ln this framework, it should also be recalled
that the NATO air command and control system
(ACCS)s'q, an automated command and control
system, combining the control of air defences,
offensive air and air support missions, does not
include the essential fields of intelligence and
threat evaluation. For these fields, ACCS, at a
cost of $25 billion over 15 to 20 years, to be finan-
ced by NATO infrastructure funds and individual
NATO member states, will have to rely on infor-
mation provided by the United States.
332. Altogether, there are enough reasons to
study the political and military aspects of a truly
common European intelligence policy without
delay.
XIV Conclasians
(a) The transfomution of NATO
333. The ftansformation of NATO initiated with
the London declaration of 1990 has since conti-
nued. NAIO has become a more politically-orien-
ted organisation. Any enlargement would be a
revolution in the European geopolitical balance
which cannot take place without further funda-
mental conceptual and structural changes.
334. When implemented, the decisions taken at
the Brussels summit meeting of January 1994,
will establish a new balance in the alliance bet-
ween Europe and North America. This may still
be difficult to achieve since the United States,
having accepted a strengthening of Europe's
defence identity, will not easily share the highest
responsibilities in the alliance.
335. A real European defence policy can exist
only if Europeans have the military means needed
to act together with their ffansatlantic allies accep-
ting to intervene out of the NATO area, or to act
alone with their own forces, possibly reinforced
59. This subject has already been dealt with in Document
1229.
with NATO assets placed at the disposal of WEU
with the agreement of the United States. To this
end, the Brussels summit meeting has developed
the concept of combined joint task forces (C.nF)
opening the possibility of separable but not sepa-
rate forces and enabling European forces to ope-
rate efficiently without the participation of the
United States.
336. The implementation of the CJTF concept is
taking longer than expected but final decisions are
expected to be taken in late spring 1995.
(b) The r6le of the CSCE
337 . Immediately after the collapse of the Berlin
wall in 1989 and the signing of the Paris Charter
in November 1990, expectations of the CSCE's
r6le in maintaining peace and stability in Europe
have been far too high.
338. Russia's recent proposals to make the
CSCE the umbrella organisation for European
security to which all others, including NATO,
would be submitted would not be the right solu-
tion for anybody.
339. It seems, howeveq that the CSCE can play
a useful r6le in conflict-prevention for which
appropriate mechanisms have been developed.
In this framework, the r6le of the High Commis-
sioner on National Minorities should not be
underestimated.
340. The conclusion of a European stability
pact, possibly in 1995 and now being negotiated
at various regional round table conferences, will
be another important part of the CSCE conflict-
prevention mechanism.
(c) Russia
341. The situation in Russia is bound to be a
determining factor for Europe's security. Nobody
would venture that at present, or in the foreseeable
future, Russia poses a serious threat to Central or
Western Europe. On the other hand, there is no
denying that the process of ransforrning Russia
into a market-oriented democracy is taking place in
a context of political instability and economic crisis
which are both equally disquieting. In Russi4 the
armed forces have traditionally been a reliable ins-
trument under fuIl control of the political authori-
ties and, in general, this is still the case. Increasing
pressure on the defence budge! however, is cau-
sing growing dissatisfaction in the armed forces
and this could be exploited by nationalist extre-
mists. At the moment, defence expenditures are
lacking transparency and this is causing serious
shorrcomings in democratic conffol of the military
budge! which is still taking too large a share of the
overall federal budget. A strong Russia will suit
Europe's security, but it should be a democratically-
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controlled constitutional state, where human rights
and rights of minorities are fully respected.
Understandably, Russia wishes to develop a close
relationship with its neighbouring states in the fra-
mework of the CIS, but this should not lead to a
restoration of imperialism with its negative aspects
of blackmail and divide and rule policy. Because of
its factual status of nuclear superpower, Russia is
entitled to a special relationship with the United
States, but this should go hand-in-hand with close
practical relations with European states, on both a
bilateral and multilateral level. Russian member-
ship of the Council of Europe is a fully-justified
prospect, provided the conditions are met, but
membership of the European Union, WEU or
NATO is out of the question. On the other hand,
these organisations should make sure that they
entertain the closest possible relations with Russia
on a pennanent basis.
342. There is no doubt about Russia's intention
to dismantle its nuclear weapons as agreed in
START I and START II, but little progress is
being made because of technical and financial
problems. Russia should accept western assistance
in this area.
343. Although it is recognised that Russia is not
the only possible source of illegal trade in nuclear
material, no counter-proliferation policy can be
successful without its full participation.
(d) The Bahic states
34. By now, the independence of the three Bal-
tic states is fully confirmed and after many initial
problems also recognised by Russia, which is
aware that any infringement of their sovereignty
would be considered by western states as an act
profoundly destabilising to Europe's security.
These states are facing numerous problems in their
efforts to build credible armed forces for which
they need help fromWestern European states. This
process has now been started and necessary agree-
ments have been or are being concluded.
345. Notwithstanding these positive develop-
ments, it should be recognised that, for their
security, they will always be dependent on good
relations with Russia and political and military
protection from other states. They have signed
up for NATO's partnership for peace and are
associate partners of WEU. On the other hand,
they have not been included in the list of the next
six candidates for European Union membership
which has recently been made public, nor have
they been included in the list of candidates for a
possible enlargement of NAIO. It is understood
that, in relations with the Baltic states, delicate
diplomacy is required vis-d-vis Russia, but they
cannot be left on their own. WEU will have to
make sure that they are included among its mem-
bers as soon as the six Cenffal European coun-
tries join the European Union and, as a conse-
quence, WEU.
(e) Risla and threats to European securily
346. There is no need to repeat the rather long
list ofpossible risks and threats to European secu-
rity; it is well known, although it does not always
seem to be taken into account. ln some cases the
threat may be immediate, others are less explosive
and of more remote importance. Ttvo regions at
Western Europe's frontiers stand out: the Balkans
and the southern Mediterranean.
347. ln the Balkans, the Bosnian conflict is still a
subject of daily concern for all countries involved
in one way or another. The risks of escalation and
of extension of the conflict to the rest of the
Balkans with possible intervention from neigh-
bouring countries can still not be excluded. Srain-
ed relations between NATO and the United
Nations, between European and ffansatlantic allies
and between different members of the contact
group over the policy to be followed, air strikes
and other issues are practically always the order of
the day.If frnally the arms embargo against Bosnia
is lifted, it may well lead to chaos and the United
Nations blue helmets will have to withdraw in
extremely difficult circumstances and the conflict
will continue. If, on the other hand, a final cease-
fire is concluded, a huge peace-keeping operation,
requiring more than 50 000 ffoops will have to be
set up. Europe should be better equipped and pre-
pared to prevent such conflicts.
348. As regards the southern Mediterranean, it is
indeed extremely difficult to control develop-
ments but Europe cannot afford to neglect a situa-
tion which might threaten its exposed under-belly.
The establishment of a cautious dialogue, ideas to
create a Conference on Security and Co-operation
in the Mediterranean (CSCM) and the perspective
of a special relationship with the European Union
in the next century should be welcomed, but that
is not enough. It is also important to establish a
European humanitarian intervention force and to
accelerate the setting-up of an Italian-Spanish-
French aero-naval force.
349. Close relations with Russia at all levels,
both bilateral and multilateral, must be established
and maintained in order to prevent Russians fee-
ling isolated. At the same time, a way must be
found to agree, with them, on the most appropriate
way of peace-keeping in Russia's near abroad,
without turning this into a new source of conflict
or new imperialism.
a wEU
350. By now, it is generally accepted that, in
order to face future risks and threats to its security,
Europe must shoulder more responsibilities in
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defence and security and create a real European
defence identity reinforcing its operational capa-
bilities. However, this is easier said than done.
351. In the Maastricht Treaty, WEU is asked to
elaborate and implement decisions and actions of
the European Union which have defence implica-
tions. This leads to fundamental political ques-
tions such as whether in defence matters the Euro-
pean Union can take autonomous decisions,
independently from NAIO and the United States.
There is also the question of how the European
Union and WEU will handle defence matters if,
inevitably, they have different membership. Will
WEU be able to remain autonomous in its own
specific field of action? Will future WEU member
states have to be NAIO members in order to be
protected by the security guarantees of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty? If no unequivocal answer is
found to these questions, there will never be a
European defence policy.
352. Some of the abovementioned questions, in
particular those regarding the relations between
WEU and the European Union with their different
membership and different authority, could be sol-
ved if both were prepared to consider the idea of ajoint European Security Council.
353. A European defence policy also depends on
the availability of the military means needed for
Europeans, either to act together with their trans-
atlantic allies outside NAIO territory, or to act
alone with their own forces, reinforced with col-
lective assets of the alliance on the basis of
consultations in the North Atlantic Council. In
this framework, implementation of the CJTF
concept is of crucial importance for Europe's
defence identity.
354. The establishment of a valid European
defence policy will have to go hand-in-hand with
a reinforcement of WEU's operational capabili-
ties. A prerequisite is for the Ministerial Council
to give up its extreme caution and gradually deve-
lop WEU into a decision-making centre rather
ttran limiting itself to the rOle of a security organi-
sation, waiting for others to act. In this frame-
work, the Council should also vest the Secretary-
General with more power. At present, too many
subjects are dealt with in ad hoc working groups.
The Secretariat-General should be extended in
order to make more knowledge directly available
to the Council, thus enhancing its performance
and efficiency. Following the example of the
Planning Cell, a pennanent " Think Cell " should
be created which could contribute to the develop-
ment of European sftategic thinking.
355. The staff and equipment of the Planning
Cell should be increased in order to transform it
into a headquarters for European co-ordination. In
its present state, the Planning Cell lacks the capa-
city to act in a crisis situation such as Rwanda.
356. Supporting the non-proliferation initiative
taken at NATO's Brussels summit meeting in
January 1994 and co-ordinating European efforts
in this field, a nuclear non-proliferation research
and monitoring cenffe should be created at WEU
level.
357. A fully-fledged European satellite intelli-
gence system will have to be established in order
to provide Europe with the intelligence needed to
make an independent judgment on crisis situa-
tions and, if needed, take its own decisions. The
WEU Satellite Cenffe in Torrej6n, if employed in
an appropriate manner, could be a first step
towards a satellite system which can be achieved
only through European co-operation.
358. There is an urgent need to establish a Euro-
pean humanitarian intervention force and to acce-
lerate the establishment of the air and naval inter-
vention force composed of French, Spanish and
Italian units announced earlier.
359. The various multinational forces which
have been or are being established such as the
allied rapid reaction corps, the Anglo-Dutch
amphibious force, the European corps and others,
should prepare the best possible co-ordination in
case they are needed for operations on a European
scale. Such co-ordination between different inter-
vention units in Europe should result in the estab-
lishment of a European rapid reaction force.
360. For all these forces, European nations will
have to provide logistics and, in particular, appro-
priate air-lift capacity. The future large aircraft, a
co-operative project which includes the major
European aircraft manufacturers, could meet
existing needs in this important area. This pro-
gramme should be given the support it needs so
that the first aircraft might be delivered in the
early years of the next decade.
361. Co-operation in the European defence indus-
try needs to be further developed. The establish-
ment of a European armaments agency must be
accelerated in order to combat American competi-
tion and achieve standardisation of the equipment
ofEuropean forces such as the European corps.
362. Finally, WEU must make a common ana-
lysis of the new security situation, taking into
account the work of the ooThink Cell " proposed
in paragraph 354 of the present report. This work
should be given a new dimension, as proposed
by the French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur,
by progressively including WEU's associate part-
ners in the analysis. It should lead to the drafting
of a white paper on European security, to be sub-
mitted to a summit meeting of European heads of
state and of government of all the countries
concerned. Approval of this white paper would be
the first evidence of European solidarity in defence
matters.
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